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"DOWN WITH DEMON DRINK!": STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING LIQUOR OUTLET
OVERCONCENTRATION IN URBAN AREAS
Shelley Ross Saxer*
Hear all the children,
Ragged and starving they cry,
"Close down the Public House
And Demon Drink will die."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Efforts to reduce alcohol related problems and improve
the quality of life in the inner city have been hampered by the
disproportionately large number of liquor stores allowed
within a geographically small area in inner cities.2 Recent
studies indicate that there is a "high correlation between the
number of liquor stores and a neighborhood's crime rate."
3
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assistance and insightful comments.
1. BRIAN BURTON, THE DRUNKARD, Act III, sc. 2 (1968) (Cambridge
Jackson, Ltd.).
2. See Judy Ronningen, Twisting the Tail of Demon Rum: Neighborhoods
Go After Drinking, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1993, at Al ("The problem is particu-
larly acute in lower-income neighborhoods, which tend to have the highest
numbers of liquor outlets"); Caswell A. Evans, Jr., Public Health Impact of the
1992 Los Angeles Civil Unrest, PuB. HEALTH REP., May 1993, at 265, 269.
3. Jill Gottesman, Corking the Bottle; Cities Try to Limit the Sale of Pack-
aged Spirits, L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1992, at J1 (citing Karen Bass, executive di-
rector of Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention, referring to a
U.S.C. study by Dr. Richard Scribner). According to Dr. Scribner's study,
"'crime [is] strongly associated with the density of alcohol outlets' in Los Ange-
les County and. .. 'reductions in crime may be achieved through policies that
reduce alcohol outlet density.'" Opinion, A Local Problem: Cities Must Be Able
to Regulate Liquor Stores, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 31, 1993, at G2. See
also Evans, supra note 2, at 265, 269 ("research has shown a significant corre-
lation between the availability of alcohol to adolescents and adults, the density
of liquor stores, the amount people drink, and the occurrence of crime, alcohol-
related deaths, and automobile collisions in the community"); Editorial, Dallas
Crime, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 29, 1993, at 10A, available in LEXIS,
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Further, urban neighborhoods are "convinced that a high con-
centration of liquor stores contributes directly to crime, drug
dealing and blight."4 According to the National Institute on
Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse, liquor contributes to 80% of
the homicides and 60% of the physical offense injuries in in-
ner cities.5 Many neighborhood nuisance problems such as
graffiti, loitering, and prostitution, are linked to the sale of
alcohol.6 Alcohol also represents a major contributor to fa-
milial problems such as divorce, child abuse, and domestic vi-
olence.7 Retail liquor stores are of particular concern to local
citizens since the sale of liquor has typically been "regarded
as involving a threat or hazard to public morals."' Therefore,
it is reasonable, and even expedient, for neighborhoods to fo-
Nexis Library, News File (highest murder rates in Dallas area exist just south
of downtown "where hundreds of bars and liquor stores continue to flourish").
4. Mary Kane, Cities Targeting Liquor Stores In Effort To Ease Blight,
Crime, HOUSTON CHRON., June 20, 1993, at C7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, News File. See Opinion, supra note 3, at G2 (violence in cities is linked
to alcohol and problem is particularly bad in minority areas); Evans, supra note
2, at 265, 269 (neighborhood frustration was manifested during the 1992 riots
when "retail alcohol outlets were specifically targeted by rioters in the impacted
areas").
5. Clarence Johnson, L.A. After the Riots; A Fight to Keep Liquor Stores
Shut, S.F. CHRON., July 1, 1992, at Al, A5. See also J. COLLINS, Alcohol Use
and Criminal Behavior: An Empirical, Theoretical, and Methodological Over-
view, in DRINKING AND CRIME: PERSPECTIVE ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 288, 290 (J. Collins ed., 1981)
(stating that a high percentage of physical offenses involve alcohol); Marc
Lacey, Last Call For Liquor Outlets?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at Al ("In
roughly one-half to two-thirds of homicides and serious assaults, alcohol is
found in the perpetrator or victim, or both").
6. Jim Tranquada, Cuts Would Cripple Liquor License Enforcement, DAILY
NEWS OF L.A., Sept. 16, 1991, at N1, available in WESTLAW, Papers Database.
See also Mirna Alfonso, Number of Stores Nearly Doubles in 10 Years; South
Gate Studies Liquor Sale Controls, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1985, at 12 (South Gate
city planning aide is quoted as saying that "the problems created by liquor
sales, included, public drunkenness and pedestrian obstruction, loitering and
littering, increased police calls and blight").
7. See M. GRANT & B. RITSON, ALCOHOL, THE PREVENTION DEBATE 11
(1983).
8. ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 17.47, at 127 (1986)
("Municipal zoning regulations that restrict the location of package stores and
stores which sell beer to take out are justified on the ground that they have a
reasonable tendency to serve the morals of the community."). See Editorial, Li-
quor Store Pollution, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 26, 1993, at B6 (liquor store com-
plaints include: patrons at a nearby liquor store scare away customers; liquor
store has been the site of numerous shootings; liquor stores "attract public
drunks who panhandle, urinate in public and sleep on the streets").
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cus their efforts on remedying alcohol related problems by
controlling small liquor outlets.9
Some people view the attempt to control liquor stores in
the inner city as an improper and ineffective way to eliminate
the social or moral evils of alcohol. 10 This article takes the
view 1 that the overabundance of liquor stores and the at-
tendant problems such as loitering, littering, graffiti, and
prostitution, as well as the visual impact of alcohol abuse on
inner city children, 12 are valid land use issues that can be
addressed through appropriate local control.13 The type of lo-
cal control at issue in inner cities is not directed at the drink-
ers' moral and social behavior, rather it is the exercise of po-
9. Gottesman, supra note 3, at J1. "'If a child on his way to school has to
walk past five liquor stores and groups of people drinking, that becomes the
norm.... It becomes the backdrop of that child's life, and the norm is to tolerate
substance abuse.'" Id. at J8 (quoting Dr. Richard Scribner).
10. See Richard Simon, Ban on Cheap, Potent Wine Making Little Impact on
Skid Row, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1990, at B1, B6 (Mike Neely, director of the
Homeless Outreach Project, a Skid Row organization staffed by former home-
less people, says "Banning alcohol is not the solution. They tried that during
Prohibition. What makes them think it will work in the 1990s?"); Thomas B.
Griffen, Note, Zoning Away the Evils of Alcohol, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1373, 1398
(1988) ("The ineffectiveness of alcohol zoning ordinances indicates that alcohol
abuse is not a land use problem, and thus should not be addressed through
zoning law."); Ronningen, supra note 2, at Al ("The liquor store and tavern
owners say the advocates of tough new controls are seeking scapegoats for in-
ner-city problems stemming from joblessness and poverty.").
11. Contrary to the impression which may have been created by the melo-
dramatic title of this article, the author does not believe, nor suggest that elimi-
nating liquor stores will necessarily rehabilitate existing alcoholics.
12. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 7.
13. Courts have recognized that the overconcentration of liquor licenses in
an area can harm the local neighborhood. See RATHKOPF ET AL., THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING 2 § 17B.03, at 17B-96 (4th ed. 1983) (citing Department
of Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 184 Cal. Rptr.
367, 370 (Ct. App. 1982) ("there is [a] symbiotic relationship between crime and
the increased consumption of alcohol in a given locale that results from an ex-
cessive number of competing sources of distribution"); Hapeville v. Anderson,
272 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. 1980) (upholding an ordinance which limited the issuance
of liquor licenses to one per each one thousand residents). See also Jones v. City
of Troy, 405 F. Supp. 464, 471 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (when considering liquor li-
cense applications, a city cannot ignore land use planning and development re-
sponsibilities since "[tihe valid exercise of liquor licensing authority necessarily
transcends the mere control of the 'evils' traditionally associated with the public
sale and consumption of alcohol"); Griffen, supra note 10, at 1404 ("Zoning law
is an appropriate tool to control the effects of alcohol use only if it addresses
land use externalities caused directly by the activity .... ").
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lice power directed at those activities contributing to social
blight in the area.' 4
While the liquor outlet overconcentration problem exists
in many major urban areas across the nation,15 South Cen-
tral Los Angeles has recently emerged as a focal point for
resolving this dilemma as a result of the Spring 1992 riots, 6
which left about two hundred liquor stores severely damaged
and in need of rebuilding.' 7 The local concern about the over-
concentration of liquor stores in South Central Los Angeles is
not new. For example, in 1983, community residents organ-
ized protests which resulted in the enactment of a conditional
use permit ordinance in the city of Los Angeles.' 8 After the
riots, however, there was an unexpected opportunity for local
14. Yu v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct.
App. 1992) (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control revoked license based on
complaints involving incidents of "drug transactions, fighting and disorderly
conduct, disturbances, stolen property, loitering, and 'suspicious circum-
stances'" that occurred on the premises of a neighborhood market selling li-
quor); Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385 (Ct. App.
1992) (local apartment tenants complained of noise and fights in the parking lot
of the tavern and of "individuals vomiting, urinating and defecating on resi-
dents' lawns and fences"); Griffen, supra note 10, at 1404 ("Zoning law is an
appropriate tool to control the effects of alcohol use only if it addresses land use
externalities caused directly by the activity, and not if it seeks to perform the
function of the state liquor licensing scheme"); L.A. Yanks OK to Rebuild Liquor
Store, SAN DIEGO UNION-ThIn., March 24, 1993, at A3 (Los Angeles City Council
rescinded Planning Commission's approval of a permit to rebuild a liquor store
destroyed during 1992 L.A. riots, based on citizen concerns that having too
many liquor stores adds to the problems of crime, poverty and public intoxica-
tion in their neighborhoods).
15. Ronningen, supra note 2, at Al ("Neighborhood groups across the coun-
try are successfully lobbying for local ordinances to regulate or chase out tav-
erns and liquor stores in what is proving to be the most aggressive alcohol-
control movement since Prohibition"); Kane, supra note 4, at C7 (discussing li-
quor store problems in Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Salinas, and Baltimore); Rob
Hotakainen, Squelching Two Neighborhood Blights; Phillips Residents Hail Li-
quor Store's Demise, STAR Tin. (Minn.), July 2, 1992, at 1B (south Minneapolis
neighborhood celebrates closing of liquor store that has been a "longtime source
of frustration for neighborhood activists"); Howard Fischer, A Limit On Liquor
Store Drive-ups?, Aiuz. Bus. GAZETTE, Dec. 23, 1993, § 1, at 3 (Phoenix consider-
ing revisions to zoning code to minimize impact of liquor stores on
neighborhoods).
16. This civil unrest followed the not guilty verdicts rendered in the state
case against Los Angeles police officers accused of unlawfully beating Rodney
King.
17. Evans, supra note 2, at 265 (civil unrest reopened issue of concentration
of liquor stores in South Central Los Angeles and provided opportunity to find
ways to limit liquor outlet reopenings); Lacey, supra note 5, at Al.
18. Evans, supra note 2, at 265.
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residents to exert greater control. Community leaders called
for a reduction in the overall number of liquor outlets by rec-
ommending several actions which included "requiring public
hearings before the reconstruction of liquor stores and other
so-called sensitive-use businesses."19 Such community activ-
ism has succeeded in slowing the reconstruction of liquor
stores in the riot-damaged area.2 °
This article will examine various options available to lo-
cal citizens to resolve the liquor store overconcentration prob-
lem. The "city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality
of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect. More-
over, the city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to ex-
periment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."2 '
On the other hand, liquor store owners argue that their prop-
erty rights are being trampled on,22 and that they should not
be held responsible for the societal ills caused by poverty and
unemployment.23 Los Angeles has been forced to confront
this issue directly as a result of the 1992 riots and the subse-
19. Jube Shiver, Jr., Red Tape, Weak Economy Cast Pall Over Rebuilding,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1992, at Al. The destruction of the liquor stores was
viewed by some community leaders "'like a miracle"' since a large number of
the stores they wanted to shut down were instead burned down. Calvin Sims,
Under Siege: Liquor's Inner-City Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1992, § 3, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (quoting Karen Bass, director of
the Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment).
"'That's not the way we wanted it to happen, but the rioting accomplished in a
few days what we have spent decades working to achieve."' Id. (quoting Karen
Bass, director of the Community Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and
Treatment). Mayor Tom Bradley appointed a liquor store task force that called
for a moratorium on new licenses in South Central Los Angeles and has recom-
mended support for owners willing to convert their business. Id.
20. Ronningen, supra note 2, at Al. "In South Central Los Angeles, resist-
ance from local residents has slowed the rebuilding of the 150 liquor stores
burned in the April, 1992, rioting that came after the acquittal of police officers
accused of beating Rodney King." Id. See infra notes 180-215 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of L.A.'s use of the conditional use permit process to
control retail liquor sales. See also Greg Krikorian, The Bottleneck; Squeezed
by Tough Restrictions, Only a Few of the Hundreds of Liquor Stores Damaged
During The Riots Have Reopened, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at 14 (as of Au-
gust, 1993, only ten of the 200 stores destroyed in the riots have reopened); Eric
Schine, Koreatown: Riot Wounds the World Doesn't See, Bus. WK., Apr. 12,
1993, at 24A (few Korean grocers are back in business partly because of new
city restrictions on renewing liquor licenses in South Central).
21. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976), reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).
22. Krikorian, supra note 20, at 14.
23. Judy Ronningen, Liquor Store Law Blocked by Judge Ruling a Setback
for Oakland's Attempts at Crime-prevention, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 22, 1993, at A19.
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quent rebuilding process. Because of this recent activity, this
article often focuses on California's attempts to resolve the
problem.
Part II of this article describes several existing models of
public regulation of retail liquor sales.24 Part III explores the
role of private control of retail liquor sales, including the ap-
plication of nuisance law, private covenants, and community
activism and redevelopment.25 Part IV concludes by offering
recommendations as to how an inner city can most effectively
reduce the social impact of the overconcentration of liquor
stores within its community.2 6
II. PUBLIC REGULATION
The states' authority to regulate the use, sale and traffic
of liquor within their borders originally emanated from their
inherent police power 27 to make regulations upholding public
safety, order, health, and morals.28 Based upon this general
police power, the states were given complete discretion to reg-
ulate alcohol, subject only to the limitations of the Constitu-
tion of the United States.29 This right to regulate was codi-
fied as early as 1890 in the Wilson Act, 30 and also in the
Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, which granted the states power to
regulate the sale and transportation of liquor within their
territory.31
24. See infra part II.
25. See infra part III.
26. See infra part IV.
27. In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 549 (1891); Hannah & Hogg v. Clyne, 263 F.
599, 603 (N.D. Ill. 1919).
28. 16 AM. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 363 (1993). "It is a generally ac-
cepted principle of law that the police power resides in the state in its sovereign
capacity, and that such power can be possessed and exercised by a municipality
only when it has been delegated by the lawmaking power of the state, a munici-
pality ordinarily having no inherent power to enact police regulations." 51
A.L.R.3d 1061, 1063 (1973). State authority to regulate liquor is currently
based on the Twenty-First Amendment, the general police power or both. See
infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
29. Congress was denied the right to infringe on the regulation of the states
except as incidental to rights conferred on them by the Constitution. Common-
wealth v. Nickerson, 128 N.E. 273, 278 (Mass. 1920); 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Li-
quors § 22 (1993).
30. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 121
(1976)).
31. Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (repealed and re-enacted
without change by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, tit. II,
§ 202, 49 Stat. 877 (1935)) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1976)).
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Despite this initial grant of power to the states to regu-
late liquor, the temperance movement during the nineteenth
century and the growing anti-drink state regulations3 2 re-
sulted in a shift to federal control. In January 1919, the
Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
was ratified.33 This Amendment stripped the states of their
exclusive power to control the liquor traffic within their bor-
ders and granted to Congress the authority to enact legisla-
tion to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating li-
quor. 4 Further, the Eighteenth Amendment expressly
provided that Congress, along with the several states, would
be granted a concurrent power to enforce the provisions of the
article 5 and thus, invalidated any state legislative attempt
to sanction what the Amendment prohibited. 6
It soon became apparent, however, that blanket federal
prohibition of alcohol only increased bootlegging and corrup-
tion.3 7 So, responsibility for liquor control was returned to
the states with the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment by
the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933. The
Twenty- First Amendment guaranteed that the transporta-
tion of intoxicating liquor into a state for the delivery or use
therein would be governed by the laws of that state.38 Both
the wording of the Twenty-First Amendment, which resem-
bles the earlier Webb- Kenyon Acts, and the legislative his-
tory suggest that the Amendment's framers intended it to re-
constitutionalize the regulatory powers held by the states
prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment.39 Re-
32. JOHN ALLEN KROUT, THE ORIGINS OF PROHIBITION 297 (1967).
33. See Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State Control
Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV.
161 (1991).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, §§ 1-2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
36. National Prohibition Cases (Rhode Island v. Palmer), 253 U.S. 350, 386
(1920).
37. LARRY ENGELMANN, INTEMPERANCE, THE LOST WAR AGAINST LIQUOR
190-92 (Free Press, N.Y. 1979); N. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL: AN INTER-
PRETATION OF AMERICAN PROHIBITION 207 (1976).
38. "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or posses-
sion of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI,
§ 2.
39. See Richard S. Mandel, Note, Liquor Advertising: Resolving the Clash
Between the First and Twenty-First Amendments, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 162
(1984).
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cent cases have further reinforced the states' power under the
Twenty-First Amendment over core concerns such as the reg-
ulation of consumption, importation, and distribution of li-
quor. 40 This authority to regulate businesses that sell liquor
is very broad and confers "something more than the normal
state authority over public health, welfare, and morals."4 1
As a result of giving control over liquor regulation back
to the states, the uniformity inherent in federal regulation
was replaced by an assortment of alcohol control laws varying
dramatically from state to state. In some states, the broad
power to regulate liquor has been delegated to local govern-
ment.42 However, this power to regulate liquor under the
Twenty-First Amendment must be distinguished from the
state's general police power to regulate for the benefit of the
public health, safety, morals or welfare.43 General police
power authority is also typically delegated to municipalities
and includes the power to enact zoning ordinances.44 These
two bases of authority for liquor regulation are separate and
distinct,45 although, because of their common origin, many
40. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990) (noting that state
liquor regulations clearly were within a state's power to regulate under the
Twenty-First Amendment, and did not violate intergovernmental immunity,
since they only indirectly (through suppliers) affected the federal government);
324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987) (discussing federal antitrust
question involving state liquor statute). When there is a potential for conflict
with a federal interest, however, state liquor statutes have been subjected to
exacting scrutiny. Spaeth, supra note 33, at 186. This article does not address
federal preemption issues and the relationship between state liquor regulation
and federal interests.
41. California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972), reh'g denied, 410 U.S.
948 (1973) (explaining the history and application of the Twenty-First Amend-
ment to states).
42. City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 96 (1986), reh'g denied, 479
U.S. 1047 (1987) (finding that a state may delegate its powers under the
Twenty-First Amendment to local governments).
43. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining how the states'
authority to regulate liquor originated from the concept of the states' general
police power authority).
44. ANDERSON, supra note 8, § 2.02, at 30. This delegation may be accom-
plished by home-rule provisions of state constitutions or by a legislative en-
abling act. Id. § 2.16, at 60.
45. Crownover v. Musick, 509 P.2d 497 (Cal. 1973) (finding that ordinances
relating to live entertainment did not conflict with state power to regulate sale
of alcohol), overruled on other grounds by Morris v. Municipal Ct., 652 P.2d 51
(Cal. 1982); Lanier v. City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253, 256 (11th Cir. 1988) (City's
power to ban topless dancing in business establishments serving alcohol is not
based on its general police power, but is instead derived from the Twenty-First
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court decisions do not differentiate them.46 Regardless of the
basis for the states' delegation of authority, local regulations
of liquor may be preempted when in conflict with general
state law or when the local governing bodies exceed their del-
egated authority.4 7 Determining whether a restriction on li-
quor stores in a local area conflicts with state authority re-
quires an examination of the specific ordinance at issue, the
state statute under which the landowner is licensed, the state
enabling act delegating authority, and any decisional con-
struction of the legislation.4"
In order to illustrate how a state's legislative choices in
delegating liquor regulation authority affect local interests,
the following sections describe existing state statutory
schemes and some of the court decisions regarding implemen-
tation of these schemes. Section A explores the various mod-
els of state and local control that exist with respect to the
division of authority under the Twenty-First Amendment to
regulate liquor.49 Section B discusses the local exercise of
Amendment, which "confers extremely broad authority to regulate business es-
tablishments where alcohol is sold").
46. See, e.g., Davidson v. Clinton, 826 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1987)
(treating the states' right to regulate liquor sales as "a dimension of the police
power" to regulate for the public health, welfare, and morals).
47. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text; ANDERSON, supra note 8,
§ 17.47. "[I]t is fundamental that municipal regulations are inferior in status
and subordinate to the laws of the state, and that a municipal regulation in
conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is inva-
lid." 51 A.L.R.3d 1061. "[Tlhe regulation of the liquor industry is frequently an
emotionally-charged issue. If... present statutes do authorize the existence of
a dual system of control, with the State and its agencies having the dominant
role, it is indeed unfortunate when conflicts and friction develop between the
regulatory bodies." Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County v.
Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 608 (Tenn. 1977). This article does not address the
preemption issues with regard to state law and tribal ordinances regulating
liquor transactions in Indian country. See generally, Brown v. District Ct., 777
P.2d 877 (Mont. 1989).
48. ANDERSON, supra note 8, § 17.47.
49. See Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d at 608:
In the exercise of its very broad powers in this field, the General As-
sembly could wholly exclude local governments from any role whatever
and place exclusive control of the sale and distribution of alcoholic bev-
erages in the state government. It could even provide for a system of
state-owned liquor stores, if it felt this were appropriate. On the other
hand it could remove state government from regulation, and place the
subject entirely in the hands of local government or, of course, it could
remove all controls and permit alcoholic beverages to be dispensed in
the same manner as ordinary articles of food and drink.
Id. See infra notes 52-168 and accompanying text.
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power under the general police power to regulate for the ben-
efit of the public health, safety, morals or welfare.5" Section
C discusses some strategies currently used in state statutory
schemes to control the overconcentration of liquor stores.5 1
A. State and Local Control Models for Twenty-First
Amendment Authority Over Liquor Regulation
States may be grouped into at least four different models
illustrating how liquor control jurisdiction and authority
under the Twenty-First Amendment is divided between state
and local governments. In addition to, and separate from,
these models, most states have also provided a "local option"
to their citizens allowing restrictive or prohibitive liquor li-
censing within individual localities.5 2 The local option is dis-
cussed as a fifth category because this delegation of authority
generally acts as an overlay feature, available along with the
other four models.
The first jurisdictional control model provides for com-
plete state control of the Twenty-First Amendment authority
over liquor licensing, with no local control or input permitted.
The second model provides for liquor control at the state level
only, but allows for the consideration of local input. The third
model grants considerable Twenty-First Amendment author-
ity to the local units. The third model is divided into three
categories which reflect how local authority is exercised: (1)
state-level control which requires approval at the local level;
(2) both state and local licensing authority; and (3) state-level
licensing which defers to local zoning authority.53 Under this
third model, any conflict between state and local authority re-
sults in state preemption.5 4 The fourth, and final model, is
exemplified by states which have delegated all liquor control
authority to the local level, thus precluding any preemption
issues.
50. See infra notes 169-237 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 238-64 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
53. Local zoning authority is granted to local units by way of "home-rule
provisions" contained in either the state constitution or in a legislative enabling
act. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at §§ 2.16, 2.17. See supra notes 43-46 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of how local zoning authority differs from
power delegated from the state to local government based on the Twenty-First
Amendment.
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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1. State Control With No Direct Local Control or Input
Only a small number of states fall within this model in
which the state prohibits local governments from directly reg-
ulating the sale and/or distribution of intoxicating liquors.5 5
55. No direct local control is available in California, District of Columbia,
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah and
West Virginia. See City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Warner Consulting Servs.,
Ltd., 262 Cal. Rptr. 349, 353-54 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that delegation of
power to local authority would be unconstitutional under the California Consti-
tution); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-115 (1992) (no issue of local governance, but li-
censing board does determine whether issuance of a license would "create or
contribute to an overconcentration of licensed establishments"); Donnelly v.
District of Columbia Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd., 452 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1982) (hold-
ing that one factor the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board must consider is
neighborhood opinion, but the Board has primary responsibility for decisions
about licensing); MONT. CODE ANN., § 16-3-309 (1993) (state authority to regu-
late liquor under the Twenty-First Amendment has not been delegated to mu-
nicipalities); City of Billings v. Laedeke, 805 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Mont. 1991) ("pol-
icy of the state of Montana to effectuate and ensure the entire control of the
manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages within the state of
Montana"); State ex rel. Libby v. Haswell, 414 P.2d 652 (Mont. 1966) (state has
exclusive authority to control liquor sales); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 177:11
(1991) (State commission licenses agency liquor stores only where there is no
state liquor store; no provision for local input unless it involves a local option
provision); People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1981); Town of Fenton v.
Tedino, 356 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 744-907 (1993)
(money may be transferred from the State Stores Fund to the Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board for its work in establishing, maintaining and operating
state liquor stores and for issuing liquor licenses to hotels, restaurants, clubs,
and public service companies); Council of Middletown Township v. Benham,
523 A.2d 311, 314 (Pa. 1987) (total state preemption of local regulation found in
"only three areas: alcoholic beverages, banking and anthracite strip mining");
Altieri v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 376 A.2d 261 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (zoning
ordinance regulating liquor business preempted by comprehensive liquor con-
trol act which sets forth requirements for restaurants to get liquor license); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 61-5-190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) ("South Carolina Alcoholic Bev-
erage Control Commission is the sole and exclusive authority empowered to
regulate the operation of all retail locations authorized to sell beer, wine, or
alcoholic beverages .... ."); Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 397 S.E.2d
662, 663 (S.C. 1990) ("Alcoholic Beverage Control Act does not prevent local
governments from regulating land use pursuant to zoning statutes." (citing City
of Norfolk v. Tiny House, Inc., 281 S.E.2d 836 (Va. 1981)); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 10-8-42 (Supp. 1994) (cities may prohibit manufacturing, sales, possession,
etc. of intoxicating beverages as long as the exercise of this authority does not
conflict with Liquor Control Act); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854
P.2d 513, 515 (Utah 1993) (Utah Alcoholic Beverage Control Act "imposes ex-
tensive regulatory control over the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages
in Utah" which includes approval and operation of "state stores" and licensing
of clubs which must be nonprofit and private); Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 481
P.2d 669 (Utah 1971) (findng that the state has power, with consent of local
authority, to issue a license to a social club to dispense alcohol); W. VA. CODE
§ 60-3A-2 (1992) (sale of liquor at retail level is no longer to be by state, but will
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
This state-dominated scheme leaves little direct say to local
government in the liquor licensing process.56 Although local
governments may disagree with the utility of this control
model, such a scheme lends certainty to the licensing func-
tion. Unfortunately, it may also eliminate valuable input
from local units which may object to the issuance of certain
licenses.57 In some cases, states falling within this model
have provided for local input by letting the local government
exercise its general police power to regulate for the benefit of
the public health, safety, morals or welfare, so long as such
exercise does not conflict with state authority.58
For example, California retains all power over liquor reg-
ulation under the Twenty-First Amendment, but provides in-
directly for local input by allowing local governments to exer-
cise their general police power. 59 The California Constitution
"reserves exclusively to the state the powers returned to the
state with the enactment of the Twenty-First Amendment." 0
However, it appears that California may move out of this ex-
clusive control model and into the second model, which allows
state consideration of local input, beginning January 1,
1995.61 On September 19, 1994, Pete Wilson, California's
Governor, signed four bills intended to give local government
more control over liquor outlets and increase the enforcement
capabilities of the California Department of Alcohol Beverage
Control ("California ABC").62 Consideration of local input is
facilitated by one of the bills, Assembly Bill 2742, which re-
instead be by retail licensees who will be controlled by state, and who will be
required to purchase the liquor from the state in order to continue revenue re-
ceipt from sales).
56. However, the local option election is available in many of these states
which utilize a total state control scheme. See infra note 152.
57. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
59. City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Warner Consulting Servs., Ltd., 262 Cal.
Rptr. 349, 353 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that such a delegation of power would be
unconstitutional under the California Constitution).
60. Id. Section 22 of article XX of the California Constitution provides:
"The State of California.... shall have the exclusive right and power to license
and regulate the manufacture sale, purchase, possession and transportation of
alcoholic beverages within the state .... " Id. at 351-52 (citing CAL. CONST. art.
XX, § 22).
61. See Jim Herron Zamora, New Laws Draw Bead on the "Bad" Liquor
Stores; State Curbs Beer and Wine Sales, Pressures Owners To Roust Crooks,
S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 21, 1994, at A5.
62. ABC: Governor Signs Key Bills to Fight Local Alcohol- Related Crimes,
PR NEWSWIRE ASSOCIATION, Sept. 20, 1994.
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quires the California ABC to send liquor license applications
to local agencies for review and comment prior to license ap-
proval.63 This new bill will require the state liquor licensing
agency "to give more deference to a local government's re-
quest to deny or impose operating conditions on a liquor or
convenience store. "64
While local governments in California have not been del-
egated Twenty-First Amendment power to regulate liquor,
municipalities do have a right to exercise their general police
power under Article XI, Section 11 of the California Constitu-
tion.65 California, consequently, has limited the power of the
state agency responsible for licensing and regulating liquor
sales, the California ABC, by providing in Business and Pro-
fessions Code Section 23790 that: "[n]o retail license shall be
issued for any premises which are located in any territory
where the exercise of the rights and privileges conferred by
the license is contrary to a valid zoning ordinance of any
county or city."6 6 Therefore, the local exercise of police power
will be respected by the California ABC as long as the ordi-
nance is valid and does not conflict with state law.67
New York also retains exclusive power, under the
Twenty-First Amendment, over the regulation of liquor.
68
63. Id.
64. Greg Lucas, Law to Ban New Liquor Licenses: Wilson Signs Bill Aimed
at Drying Up Crime, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1994, at A15.
65. City of Rancho Cucamonga v. Warner Consulting Servs., Ltd., 262 Cal.
Rptr. 349, 353 (Ct. App. 1989).
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23790 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
67. See Floresta, Inc. v. City Council of San Leandro, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182 (Ct.
App. 1961) (local ordinance restricting use of cocktail lounge within 200 feet of a
residential district was not preempted by state regulation of liquor sales); Mus-
salli v. City of Glendale, 252 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (Ct. App. 1988) (City ordinance
restricting sale of liquor at automobile service stations is preempted.by state
liquor regulation); Cristmat, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 93 Cal. Rptr. 325
(Ct. App. 1971) (Los Angeles County ordinance which prohibited people from
consuming, using or being under the influence of alcohol while entering or re-
maining in a model studio providing human models, often nude, for professional
and amateur photographers was not preempted by state liquor regulation);
Town Council of Los Gatos v. State Bd. of Equalization, 296 P.2d 909, 911 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1956) ("[zloning ordinances cannot single out and prohibit the sale of
liquor"); Jon-Mar Co. v. Anaheim, 20 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1962) (Anaheim
ordinance forbidding operation of tavern unless tavern acquired variance was
not invasion into state's jurisdiction over liquor licensing); See also infra notes
180-215 discussing the use of a conditional use permit in California to control
liquor sales at the local level.
68. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 43 (Consol. 1993). "The liquor authority
of the state is empowered to carry out the policy of the state as to the regulation
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The state liquor authority determines "whether public con-
venience and advantage will be promoted by the issuance of
licenses," and also determines the number and location of li-
censed premises 9.6  As in California, the New York statutory
scheme facilitates some local input by allowing the exercise of
local authority under the general police power. Local county
or city boards are established and they may recommend to
the liquor authority whether a license to sell alcoholic bever-
ages at the retail level should be issued, refused, or re-
voked.7 ° In addition, these local boards have general police
power authority to regulate the hours of operation for retail
liquor outlets. 71 This authority, held by local boards under
state control, is only advisory in nature. The state liquor
agency has exclusive control under the Twenty-First Amend-
ment authority over the issuance and denial of licenses and
has discretion to accept or reject the recommendation of a lo-
cal board.72 In contrast to California, municipalities in New
York are prohibited from requiring special permits under
zoning regulations because the state preempts the field of li-
quor licensing.73 New York decisions uniformly hold that lo-
cal attempts to control liquor sales directly are preempted by
state law.7 4
and control of the manufacture, sale and distribution within the state of alco-
holic beverages." Id. § 2. See People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1981)
(This chapter "is exclusive and statewide in scope, thus, no local government
could legislate in field of regulation of establishments which sell alcoholic bever-
ages."); Town of Fenton v. Tedino, 356 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
("State, through [this chapter,] has preempted the field and has determined
that the regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages is solely within the juris-
diction of the state legislature, and under such declared state policy, local gov-
ernments have no right to legislate with respect to those activities."); Cannon v.
Syracuse, 340 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (regulation of sale of liquor is solely
within authority of state). See also RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 13, § 17B.03.
69. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CoNT. LAw § 2 (Consol. 1993).
70. Id. § 43; Fenson v. State Liquor Auth., 273 N.Y.S. 751 (1934), aff'd, 278
N.Y.S. 433 (1935) (local boards created with the power of recommendation
only); Trustees of Calvary Presbyterian Church v. State Liquor Auth., 281
N.Y.S. 81 (1935), aff'd, 200 N.E. 288 (1936).
71. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAw § 43 (Consol. 1993) (power to restrict hours,
however, shall not be exercised by the New York City Board).
72. Gitenstein v. O'Connell, 90 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1949); Davidson v. O'Connell,
90 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1947).
73. Cannon v. Syracuse, 340 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1973) (local regulation that re-
quires special use permit conflicts with state's exclusive control over the regula-
tion of liquor)..
74. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
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The New York and California statutory schemes retain
ultimate authority to regulate liquor at the state level. Indi-
rect local control is allowed by permitting the exercise of local
police power as long as it does not directly regulate liquor or
conflict with state law.
2. State Control With Consideration of Local Input
The second model differs from the first scheme in that
cities and counties may have a right to be heard before issu-
ance, suspension, or revocation of a liquor license by the state
board. Thus, states in this category permit direct influence
by the local authority regarding liquor regulation. Only a few
states use this system which allows for direct local input, but
does not delegate to cities and counties the state's power
under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate the sale and
distribution of liquor.7 5
75. States using this system include Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, and Vermont. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-2651 (1964 & Supp.
1993) (State director must notify city or county prior to granting a license or
renewal, and city or county may request that the director hold a hearing on the
granting or refusal to grant the license or renewal. At the hearing, the city or
county governing body has the right to appear before the director and make
recommendations on the granting or refusal to grant the license or renewal and
the director will take into consideration the testimony, evidence and recommen-
dations of the governing body); Garten Enters. v. City of Kansas City, 549 P.2d
864, 868 (Kan. 1976) ("Power to regulate all phases of the control of the manu-
facture, distribution, sale, possession, transportation and traffic in alcoholic li-
quor and the manufacture of beer regardless of alcoholic content, except as spe-
cifically delegated in the act, is vested exclusively in the state."); Bolin v.
Wichita City Council, 771 P.2d 948 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (city's police power
extends to the regulation of matters relating to liquor); Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-
37 (1972 & Supp. 1991) (State Tax Commission under the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Division has the power to issue or refuse to issue, to revoke, suspend or
cancel permits and may "call upon other administrative departments of the
state, county and municipal governments, county and city police departments
and upon prosecuting officers for such information and assistance as it may
deem necessary in the performance of its duties."); Id. § 67-1-57 (Before a per-
mit is issued, the commission shall consider whether the permit is appropriate
considering the "character of the premises and the surrounding neighborhood"
and "may give consideration to any recommendations made in writing by the
district or county attorney or county, circuit or chancery judge of the county, or
the sheriff of the county, or the mayor or chief of police of an incorporated city or
town wherein the applicant proposes to conduct his business."); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-901 (1943 & Supp. 1994) (city or county government must be given notice
and opportunity to object to an ABC permit before it is issued by state, but state
has sole power to determine suitability of applicant for a permit); In re
Melkonian, 355 S.E.2d 503, 508 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 360 S.E.2d
91 (N.C. 1987) (The state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission has "exclu-
sive authority to determine the suitability of applicants to obtain the appropri-
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States using this scheme afford localities a right to be
heard regarding the granting, refusal, or renewal of a state
liquor license through a written submission procedure or for-
mal hearings.7 6 The state, however, retains the final deci-
sion-making authority for all liquor licensing and regula-
tion. 7 Moreover, local zoning regulations are invalid where
the ordinance has the effect of depriving individuals of liquor
licenses or privileges granted by the state. 78 Thus, this liquor
regulatory scheme retains the certainty of uniform state con-
trol, while also allowing localities to express their concerns
regarding liquor sales.79
For example, in Ohio, local authorities must be notified
and given an opportunity "for a complete hearing upon the
advisability of the issuance, transfer of ownership, or transfer
of location of the permit." 0 Nevertheless, the state has the
ultimate authority to decide whether to take a particular li-
ate permits and licenses to sell intoxicating beverages."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4303.26 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1993) (State Commission required to give
notice of license application to local governing body so recommendations may be
heard); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 471.210, 471.295 (1993) (state commission controls
licensing based on public interest and protection of public welfare, but considers
recommendations from city or county governing body); Sekne v. Portland, 726
P.2d 959, 961 (Or. 1986) (Liquor Control Act fully replaces and supersedes all
municipal enactments or inconsistent local ordinances) (citing OR. REV. STAT.
§ 471.045 (1993)); Verrill v. Dewey, 299 A.2d 182, 186 (Vt. 1972) (state control
not delegated to local government, but state uses local commissioners as agents
of state to administer state regulations).
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-2651 (1964 & Supp. 1993) (affording rights, upon
request, to city or county governing bodies to present evidence, testimony, and
recommendations that the State Director will take into account in making a
decision); Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-57 (1972 & Supp. 1991) (allowing for certain
city or county officials to submit recommendations in writing); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-901 (1943 & Supp. 1994) (requiring State Commission to give notice of
license application to local governing body so recommendations may be heard);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.26 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1993) (similar
requirements).
77. See, e.g., In re Melkonian, 355 S.E.2d 503 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
360 S.E.2d 91 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling in favor of petitioner who argued
that the ABC Commission, in granting petitioner a liquor license preempted the
localities' denial of a special use permit based on a local ordinance).
78. See, e.g, City of Westlake v. Mascot Petroleum Co., 573 N.E.2d 1068,
1074 (Ohio 1991) ("[A] municipality is without authority to extinguish privi-
leges arising [from state permission] through the enforcement of zoning
regulations.").
79. A municipality's opportunity to voice an opinion may be of limited value
because the state retains the ultimate authority regardless of local concerns.
80. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.26 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1993) (the
chief peace officer of the political subdivision is also notified and may appear at
a hearing).
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censing action. This division of authority is illustrated in
City of Westlake v. Mascot Petroleum Co.,"' where the City
attended a hearing regarding an automotive service station's
liquor permit application to sell beer and wine.82 Despite the
City's opposition to this application, a license was issued.8 3
The City later filed suit against the mini-market alleging that
it was violating a local ordinance, which prohibited selling al-
coholic beverages at service stations.8 4 The mini-market, in
response, argued successfully that the state's liquor licensing
authority allows a community to use only the local option
election to control the sale of alcoholic beverages and, thus,
state authority preempted the local ordinance.85
The Westlake court noted that "[wihile the City may opt
to ban liquor sales entirely from selected areas (e.g., residen-
tial), it may not selectively prohibit sales of alcoholic bever-
ages within previously permitted zones."86 The mini-market
was located in a general business district and the City al-
lowed the sale of alcoholic beverages as a permitted use in
such districts.8 ' Therefore, the court held that the "City's at-
tempt to further prohibit such sales conflicts with the state
statutory scheme and must fail."88 This case demonstrates
how Ohio has allowed municipalities to exercise local self-
government as long as such regulations under the general po-
81. City of Westlake v. Mascot Petroleum Co., 1990 WL 48960 (Ohio App.
Apr. 19, 1990), aff'd, 573 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio 1991).
82. Id. at *1.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *6 (citing amendments to Ohio Revenue Code section 4303.292
which nullified the holding in Ridgley, Inc. v. Wadsworth Bd. of Zoning Ap-
peals, 503 N.E.2d 1036 (Ohio 1986), where the court held that the state could
not issue a liquor permit since a local zoning ordinance prohibited a gas station
from selling beer for carry-out).
86. City of Westlake v. Mascot Petroleum Co., 1990 WL 48960, at *7 (Ohio
App. Apr. 19, 1990), affd, 573 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio 1991) (citing amendment to
Ohio Revised Code section 4303.26 which states in part:
In this hearing, no objection to the issuance, transfer of ownership, or
transfer of location of the permit shall be based upon the noncompli-
ance of the proposed permit premises with local zoning regulations
which prohibit the sale of beer or intoxicating liquor, in an area zoned
for commercial or industrial uses, for a permit premises that would
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lice power authority do not conflict with state laws.8 9 In
Ohio, the control and regulation of liquor is not part of the
local police power and is, instead, regulated exclusively by
the state.90 States with statutory schemes similar to Ohio re-
tain their exclusive power to regulate liquor under the
Twenty-First Amendment, but allow direct local input and
the exercise of local police power, provided there is no conflict
with state law.
3. Shared State and Local Control With Preemption
The third liquor regulatory model provides for shared
control between state and local government based upon the
delegation of Twenty-First Amendment power. 91 This shared
control model can be divided into three categories based upon
the method in which jurisdiction is shared-local approval,
local licensing, and local regulation. Similar to the two previ-
ously discussed models, this third model also renders local li-
quor regulation ineffective if it conflicts with state law. 92
89. See also Neil House Hotel Co. v. City of Columbus, 58 N.E.2d 665, 667
(Ohio 1944).
90. Id. See also City of Lyndhurst v. Compola, 169 N.E.2d 558, 560 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1960) ("regulation of the manufacture and sale of liquor in Ohio has
been completely preempted by the state").
91. Not all states and courts distinguish between authority under the
Twenty-First Amendment and general police power authority. See supra note
47 and accompanying text.
92. Recognize when viewing these models that the classifications discussed
in this article are invented by the author and, therefore, not all state schemes
fall neatly into a particular category. For example, Iowa requires local approval
and also allows local regulation that does not conflict with the state. See IowA
CODE ANN. § 123.32 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (local board approves or disap-
proves licensing action before state administrator reviews application); Id.
§ 123.39 (local authorities may suspend liquor license if local ordinance or regu-
lation is violated as long as such local law is not in conflict with state law);
Wright v. Town of Huxley, 249 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Iowa 1977) (state delegation of
Twenty-First Amendment authority to cities and towns under section 123.39 is
proper). Also, Arkansas provides for local licensing as well as local regulation.
See infra note 111. Oklahoma requires local approval in the form of a certificate
of zoning issued by the municipality, but also delegates the power to municipal-
ities to enact ordinances. See infra note 123. Tennessee requires that a permit
be issued by the city and county, but also recognizes a system of dual control
allowing local ordinances to regulate the location of retail liquor stores. See
infra note 111. Virginia allows local governing bodies to issue licenses, enact
ordinances governing location of liquor outlet, and object to issuance of a license
by the state. See infra note 111.
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a. Local Approval
Several states provide that local governments must ap-
prove state licensing decisions before a licensing action will
take place.93 The method for obtaining this approval varies
slightly among the states employing this scheme. Some
93. The states contained within this model are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, and South
Dakota. See ALA. CODE § 28-3A- 23(d) (1992) (retail liquor license application
must be approved by municipal governing authority before license can be
granted); Lanier v. City of Newton, 842 F.2d 253, 256 (11th Cir. 1988) (based on
response of Alabama Supreme Court to certified questions, 11th circuit held
that local ordinance banning topless dancing in business establishments serv-
ing alcohol is not preempted by state regulation of the field or inconsistent with
state law); ALAsKA STAT. § 04.11.480 (1994) (state may not approve a license
action if local governing body protests such action and protest is not arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable); Stoltz v. City of Fairbanks, 703 P.2d 1155
(Alaska 1985) (finding that the City's protest against liquor store because of
overconcentration of bars in proposed location was not arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-201 (1993) (local governing body
must recommend approval or disapproval of license application within 60 days
after application is filed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 543(g) (1992) (applicant for
new license or extension must submit documentation showing that premises
are properly zoned for intended use and that applicant has complied with all
licensing requirements of local governing body); Hooper v. Delaware Alcoholic
Beverage Control Comm'n, 409 A.2d 1046 (Del. 1979) (finding that a provision
requiring license applicants to first obtain local zoning approval is a reasonable
accommodation of jurisdiction conflicts); IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-19-1 (West
1980 & Supp. 1994) ("The commission in its absolute discretion shall issue, sus-
pend, or revoke, except as otherwise provided in this title, a retailer's or dealer's
permit of any type"); Id. § 7.1-3-19-11 (requiring state to follow recommenda-
tion of a majority of a local board regarding licensing action as long as recom-
mendation is not arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 123.32 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (local board approves or disapproves licens-
ing action before state administrator reviews application); Id. § 123.39 (local
authorities may suspend liquor license if local ordinance or regulation is vio-
lated as long as such local law is not in conflict with state law; ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28-A, § 653 (West 1993) (municipal or county commissioners must ap-
prove or deny applications for or transfers of on-premises licenses with appeal
to the state available); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.17 (West 1989 & Supp.
1994) (state issues license after local approval and local legislative body may
request that state revoke license if licensee has committed violations); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 369.200 (Michie 1991) (local body must approve or disap-
prove license applications, but state may disregard such recommendation if ar-
bitrary, unreasonable, or unjust); Kochendorfer v. Board of County Comm'rs of
Douglas County, 566 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Nev. 1977) (state has delegated its power
to regulate liquor under the Twenty-First Amendment to local board); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 60-6B-4 (Michie 1994) (local governing body must approve or dis-
approve liquor license action and recommendation must be followed by state);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-2-1.2 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (applications for retail
liquor licenses must be submitted to local governing board for approval or dis-
approval prior to review by the state).
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states require that an applicant file an application with the
local governing body, which then makes a recommendation to
the state before it takes any licensing action.94 Other states
notify the local governing body about the requested action,
and if the local authority protests the action then the state
cannot approve the action.95 Most states following this
scheme retain the power to override a municipal recommen-
dation if it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
96
The local approval approach offers a great deal of power
to municipalities unless municipal and state decisions con-
flict. However, state decisions do not necessarily preempt lo-
cal control when state and local findings clash. 97 For exam-
ple, in a Michigan case, Stafford's Restaurant, Inc. v. City of
Oak Park,98 the court found that the City was not precluded
from enacting a resolution prohibiting the consideration of
licenses for the sale of liquor for consumption on premises
within the City's authority.99 The court determined that the
city ordinance was not preempted by the state because the
ordinance was not in direct conflict with the state liquor li-
censing scheme. 100 In addition, the state did not have exclu-
sive control, because the Michigan Liquor Control Act ex-
pressly delegates authority to local legislative bodies to
approve a liquor license application before the state Liquor
Control Commission grants the license. 10 1
When addressing preemption issues, Michigan decisions
have differentiated between local power delegated under the
Twenty- First Amendment and local power delegated under
94. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-3A-23(d) (1992); IowA CODE ANN. § 123.32
(West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
95. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 04.11.480 (1994).
96. See, e.g., id.; IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-19-11 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 369.200 (Michie 1991).
97. See, e.g., Stafford's Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Oak Park, 341 N.W.2d
235 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), appeal denied, 357 N.W.2d 658 (Mich. 1984) (holding
that city ordinance was not preempted by state regulatory scheme since the
Michigan Liquor Control Act delegated to the local legislative body, the right to
approve applications for liquor licenses before the state commission could act);
Indiana Alcoholic Bev. Comm'n v. State ex rel. Harmon, 379 N.E.2d 140 (Ind.
1978) (requiring state commission to follow local recommendations when three
or more members of a local board vote to deny an application for a permit).
98. 341 N.W.2d 235 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), appeal denied, 357 N.W.2d 658
(Mich. 1984).
99. Id. at 238.
100. Id. at 237.
101. Id. at 238.
142 [Vol. 35
DOWN WITH DEMON DRINK
the general police power.1 0 2 In Fuller Central Park Properties
v. City of Birmingham,10 3 the City was allowed to limit the
number of liquor licenses it issued to a number below the
maximum allowed by state statute.10 4 The court noted that
municipalities have the power to enact ordinances relating to
local concerns as long as such ordinances do not conflict with
state law.10 5 In this case, the court found that there was no
conflict between state and local law, and that the Michigan
Liquor Control Act had not preempted the City's ordinance by
occupying the field of liquor regulation to the exclusion of lo-
cal control.' 0 6 Although the Michigan Legislature provides
that the state has "the sole right, power and duty to control
the alcoholic beverage traffic" in Michigan, this broad power
is subject to the requirement that local governing bodies ap-
prove licenses before the state issues them. 0 7 Therefore, the
court determined that the state's power to control liquor li-
censing is not exclusive and that the Legislature did not in-
tend "to pre-empt city action adopting a policy of approving
fewer licenses than the maximum number permitted by stat-
ute."10 The City's resolution, which limited the number of
liquor licenses to be issued, was not in direct conflict with the
Michigan Liquor Control Act and it was not preempted by the
Legislature. 109
102. See, e.g., Mutchall v. Kalamazoo, 35 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Mich. 1948) (local
ordinance was adopted for preservation of public safety, health and morals and
for "purpose of licensing and inspecting premises not under the jurisdiction of
the Michigan liquor control commission"); Johnson v. Liquor Control Comm'n,
254 N.W. 557, 558 (Mich. 1934) ("The very nature of the liquor business is such
that local communities, as a matter of policy, should be permitted to regulate
the traffic within their own bounds in the proper exercise of their police power,
subject to the larger control of the Liquor Commission as to those matters
wherein the commission is given exclusive powers by the Legislature"), over-
ruled in part by, Bundo v. Walled Lake, 238 N.W. 2d 154 (Mich. 1976); Raven,
Inc. v. City of Southfield, 245 N.W.2d 370, 371 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd, 387
N.W.2d 925 (Mich. 1977) ("The regulation of establishments selling alcoholic
beverages is a special area and one in which the local community has been
given a great deal of control.") (citing Bundo v. City of Walled Lake, 238 N.W.2d
154 (Mich. 1976)).
103. 296 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
104. Id. at 90.
105. Id. at 91.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 92 (quoting MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.971 (Callaghan 1979)).
108. Fuller Central Park Properties v. City of Birmingham, 296 N.W.2d 88,
92-93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
109. Id. at 93.
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Requiring local approval of state liquor licensing actions
is one way for communities to control liquor sales in their
neighborhood. State decisions may preempt these local find-
ings if there is a direct conflict between state and local law.
However, a state court may avoid this preemption conflict by
distinguishing between local control under the general police
power which may conflict with the state's Twenty-First
Amendment authority, and local liquor control under the
Twenty-First Amendment.1 10 If control has been delegated
based on Twenty- First Amendment authority, local exercise
of this delegated authority should not be in conflict with any
state exercise of authority.
b. Local Licensing
Another method used by states to divide jurisdictional
control is to allow local governing bodies to license the liquor
outlets.' Typically, in states using this scheme, local liquor
110. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
111. States classified within this subcategory include Arkansas, Colorado,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-4-201 (Michie 1987) (granting Alcoholic Bever-
age Control Board discretion to determine number of permits to be granted
within each county or within limits of any municipality and to determine loca-
tion based on certain specified conditions); Id. § 3-4-211 (explaining that state
cannot issue license until a public hearing has been held if there is a protest
against such issuance by a governing official of the city or county to whom the
notice of an application for permit has been mailed); Id. § 3-5-213 (granting
authority to municipalities to pass ordinances governing the issuance and revo-
cation of licenses for retail sale of liquors and may impose additional restric-
tions to promote public health, morals and safety); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12- 47-
135 (1992) (stating that local licensing authority may issue retail liquor store
license); Canjar v. Huerta, 566 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Colo. 1977) ("[Sltatutory
scheme in this state vests in the local licensing board the authority to deter-
mine the need for the issuance of particular licenses for the sale of alcoholic
beverages."); Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Auth. of Boulder, 490 P.2d 299, 301
(Colo. 1971) (explaining that before a liquor license can be issued or transferred,
the state authority must approve the action of the local authority since "[tihe
concurrent action of the two authorities is mandatory"); GA. CODE ANN. § 3- 3-2
(1991 & Supp. 1994) (granting local governing body has authority to grant, re-
fuse, suspend, or revoke liquor permits or licenses); Page v. Jackson, 398 F.
Supp. 263, 265 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (obtaining a local license is a prerequisite to
obtaining a state liquor license); IDAHO CODE § 23-916 (1987 & Supp. 1004) (au-
thorizing each county and incorporated city may license retail sale of liquor by
the drink, impose and collect license fees, and regulate as long as regulations do
not conflict with state statutory provisions); Id. § 23-1009 (requiring beer re-
tailer to obtain license from municipality, county and state); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
235, para. 5/3-14 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requiring that local license be issued prior
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to issuance of state license); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.370 (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1981 & Supp. 1994) (requiring applicant for license to sell alcoholic bever-
ages to obtain approval for county or city license prior to applying for state li-
cense); Whitehead v. Estate of Bravard, 719 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Ky. 1986)
(granting cities authority to impose liquor license fees, but not quotas on the
number of licenses issued); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:284 (West 1993) (explain-
ing that local governing authority makes decision whether or not to issue local
permit and then notifies state commissioner, who issues a separate state permit
but must withhold issuance of state permit if local permit has been withheld);
La. Op. Att'y Gen. 339, 340 (1946-48) ("State Collector of Revenue must give
notice to local authorities of application for liquor permit and should refuse to
issue state permit where local authorities refuse a permit on legal grounds.");
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 138, § 67 (West 1976 & Supp. 1994) (authorizing
local licensing authorities to grant or refuse to grant licenses and requiring
state commission to hold a hearing on any appeal of a refusal to grant); Board of
Selectmen v. Alcoholic Bevs. Control Comm'n, 519 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1988) (Alcoholic Beverage Control "Commission cannot override a deci-
sion of the local authorities to deny an application for an original license or an
application to transfer an existing license to another location."), review denied,
523 N.E.2d 267 (Mass. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 340A.405, 340A.410 (West
1990 & Supp. 1994) (stating that cities and counties may issue licenses with the
approval of the state commissioner, but "a county may not issue a retail license
to sell any alcoholic beverage within an organized town unless the governing
body of the town has consented to the issuance of the license"); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 312.140 (Vernon 1993) (granting counties, cities, towns and villages authority
to issue permits/licenses for nonintoxicating beer as long as control is not incon-
sistent with state); State v. City of Riverside, 640 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) ("It is well established that cities may fix standards to be met before issu-
ing a liquor license, the only requirement being that the ordinance must not
conflict with the state statute") (quoting State ex rel. Southland Corp. v. City of
Woodson Terrace, 599 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)); State ex rel.
Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Downing, 757 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stat-
ing that the rationale for regulation of the sale of nonintoxicating beer under
section 312.140 is applicable to sale of intoxicating beverages since, in both in-
stances, the legislature delegated power to regulate to local communities); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 5-02-01, 5-02-02 (1991) (requiring both a state and local retail
license, and demanding that the applicant obtain a local license prior to the
state license); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-02-09 (1991) (authorizing local governing
body by ordinance or resolution to restrict number of licenses granted); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 3-5-15 (1989 & Supp. 1993) (explaining that local boards are given
power to issue liquor licenses within a fixed maximum number); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 57-5-104 (Supp. 1994) (requiring that retail liquor business must obtain
permit from the county and/or city where the business is to be conducted); Met-
ropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601,
606 (Tenn. 1977) ("Tennessee statutory scheme for regulation of [retail liquor]
stores envisions a dual system of control, participated in both by the local gov-
ernments and by the Commission."); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-38 (Michie 1993) (gov-
erning body of each county, city or town may issue liquor licenses and charge
license taxes in addition to the state license); Id. §§ 4-3 (A)(2)(a), 4-3 l(A)(3) (ex-
plaining that the state may refuse to grant a license if the location does not
conform to the requirements of the local governing body and the local governing
bodies are notified of the application and given the opportunity to object); City
of Norfolk v. Tiny House, 281 S.E.2d 836, 841 (Va. 1981) (clarifying state liquor
act does not prevent local governments from regulating land use); Wis. STAT.
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licenses are issued in addition to licenses issued by the state.
In Illinois, for example, a state liquor license applicant must
first obtain a local license for the premises to be used for li-
quor sales.1 12 Local governing bodies in Illinois are given
broad authority over liquor licensing and have the power to
grant, suspend, or revoke a local license within their jurisdic-
tion. 113 The state commission does have the power to "recom-
mend to local commissioners rules and regulations, not incon-
sistent with the law, for the distribution and sale of alcoholic
liquors throughout the state." 4 However, the local commis-
sioner has the exclusive power to judge the qualifications of a
license applicant, subject only to a right of appeal to the state
commissioner."1 5
The Liquor Control Act in Illinois "created a dual retail
liquor licensing system" whereby state and local units have
concurrent authority to regulate liquor licensing. 111 For in-
stance, both the state and local commissioners are empow-
ered by the Liquor Control Act to revoke a retail liquor li-
cense.' The Act provides that "[t]he revocation of a local
license shall automatically result in the revocation of a State
license."" 8 However, because a licensee is issued "two sepa-
rate and distinct retail liquor licenses by two separate and
ANN. § 125.51 (West 1992) (authorizing municipalities to grant and issue liquor
licenses); Tavern League of Wis. v. City of Madison, 389 N.W.2d 54, 56 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1986) (city has authority to grant liquor license and require licensee to
meet local requirements in addition to state requirements), review denied, 393
N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 12-4-101 (1986) (granting cities, towns,
and counties the authority to license, regulate or prohibit the retail sale of
liquor).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 235, para. 5/3-14 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Retail Liquor
Dealers Protective Ass'n v. Fleck, 96 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ill. 1951) (stating that
when local license has been obtained and applicant has paid license fee, state
must issue state license).
113. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 235, para. 5/4-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Park Liquors,
Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 259 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970).
114. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 235, para. 5/3-12(4) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
115. Fleck, 96 N.E.2d at 561.
116. Park Liquors, 259 N.E.2d at 334; Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n v. City
of Joliet, 324 N.E.2d 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
117. Spiros Lounge, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 423 N.E.2d 1366
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
118. Park Liquors, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 259 N.E.2d 331,
335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970). Nevertheless, the indirect control that is exerted by a
local commissioner over the issuance and revocation of state licenses is not
present when there is a suspension of the local license. Id. "[T]he legislature
did not intend that action by a local commissioner suspending a local retail li-
quor license should preempt the exercise of jurisdiction by the State Commis-
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distinct licensing bodies," a determination by a local commis-
sioner does not necessarily bar an action by the independent
state body.119 This shared control allows local liquor ordi-
nances to regulate the same subject matter as the state stat-
utes, but only if they are more restrictive or if they place re-
quirements on the licensee in excess of the state
requirements. 12
0
In general, dividing jurisdiction by allowing for local li-
censing may provide an effective means of local control over
liquor sales. Local government may also be motivated to use
this scheme in order to obtain revenue through the collection
of licensing fees. States that allow local governmental units
to collect license fees may, however, restrict the amount of
the fee that may be collected. 121 While local licensing bene-
fits the locality with its revenue potential, it also provides lo-
cal citizens the opportunity to directly control the licensing
actions concerning liquor sales in their neighborhood.
c. Local Regulation
The final method used in which state and local authori-
ties share control is where the state delegates its Twenty-
First Amendment authority to local government to enact li-
quor control ordinances that do not conflict with the state
statutory scheme. This category is sometimes difficult to dif-
ferentiate from the first model where the state retains com-
sion to revoke or suspend the state license based upon the same violations of
the Act or appropriate rule or regulation." Id.
119. Id. at 336.
120. Easter Enters. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 449 N.E.2d 1013,
1016-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding invalid a city ordinance, identical to a state
statute except for the effective date of an exemption from a distance regulation,
which was more liberal, rather than more restrictive, than the state statute).
121. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-4-202 (Michie 1992) (municipalities and
counties may license and tax liquor sales, but amount of license fee is limited to
"an amount equal to one- half (1/2) of the license fee collected" by the state);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-106 (West 1992) (local license cannot be issued
until share of license fee due the state has been received by department of reve-
nue); IDAHO CODE § 23-916 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (county and city may license
sale of liquor and collect license fees, not to exceed 75% of the amount of the
state license fee); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.405 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (city
may impose an additional license fee in an amount not to exceed 20% of the
county license fee); Mo. REV. STAT. § 312.140 (1992) (county license fee for non-
intoxicating beer may not exceed state fee, and city license fee shall not exceed
one and one-half times amount charged for state license); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.51 (West 1992) (minimum and maximum fees specified in statute for each
type of retail license).
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plete Twenty-First Amendment authority, but allows local
regulation based upon the municipalities' general police
power.122 For purposes of this article, states will be tenta-
tively identified under this model if they appear to have dele-
gated their Twenty-First Amendment authority, in addition
to their general police power authority, to local governing
bodies to authorize local regulation.
123
122. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23790 (West 1993); Crownover v.
Musick, 509 P.2d 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), overruled on other grounds by Morris
v. Municipal Ct., 652 P.2d 51 (Cal. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-5-190 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1993); Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd. 397 S.E.2d
662 (S.C. 1990). See supra note 55.
123. States included within this subcategory are Connecticut, Florida, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-44
(West 1993) ("The department of liquor control shall refuse permits for the sale
of alcoholic liquor (1) in no-permit towns and (2) where prohibited by the zoning
ordinance of any city or town."); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 562.14, 562.45(2) (West
1993) (municipalities have power delegated by legislature to regulate hours of
business and location of place of business for liquor licenses); City of Miami
Springs v. J.J.T., Inc., 437 So. 2d 200, 205 (Fla. 1983) ("municipality's power
over establishments selling alcoholic beverages was not limited, despite the lan-
guage of the statute, to hours of operation, location of the business, and sani-
tary regulations, but instead extended to any regulation which did not interfere
with some provision of, or affect any purpose in, the Beverage Act") (citing Nel-
son v. State ex rel. Gross, 26 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1946); City of Daytona Beach v. Del
Percio, 476 So. 2d 197, 201 (Fla. 1985) ("Florida municipalities (and counties
... ) have the authority to exercise the regulatory power of the Twenty-First
Amendment"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-40 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (Governing
board or body of municipality has authority to, by ordinance, limit the number
of licenses and place other restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages; how-
ever, such actions by the municipality are subject to appeal and reversal at the
state level); State v. Reid, 87 A.2d 562, 564 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1952) (find-
ing that the Legislature had delegated to municipalities the authority to make
police regulations on liquor traffic; therefore, the city has the power to regulate
the sale of alcoholic beverages); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37 § 503 (West 1992)
(Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is an exercise of the police power
and gives municipalities the authority to enact ordinances consistent with the
Act, but does not authorize any city or town to issue a license); Id. § 523 (certifi-
cate of zoning compliance must be issued by the municipality or county before
the state will take any license action); Jack's Supper Club, Ltd. v. City of Nor-
man, 361 P.2d 291, 293-94 (Okla. 1961) (finding that the state has exclusive
authority to issue and regulate liquor licenses, but city has police power to pass
an ordinance to protect public health, safety, morals and general welfare of soci-
ety as long as it does not conflict with state statutes or rules); Blackman v. City
of Big Sandy, 507 F.2d 935, 936 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that a Texas statute
expressly provides that cities and towns may "designate certain zones in the
residential section or sections of said cities and towns ... where such sales (of
beer) may be prohibited."); Young, Wilkinson & Roberts v. City of Abilene, 704
S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. 1985) (finding that the City granted zoning power to re-
strict the sale of alcoholic beverages "for the protection of the health, morals,
safety, peace and convenience of the public.") (quoting Eckert v. Jacobs, 142
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Connecticut is an example of a state which appears to
have delegated its Twenty-First Amendment power to local
authorities to enact liquor control ordinances. However,
there is confusion within the state itself as to whether this is
a delegation of power under the Twenty-First Amendment or
under the general police power. Connecticut requires that a
liquor license applicant comply with local zoning ordinances
before a permit is granted by the State Liquor Control Com-
mission.124 The state has thus delegated to municipalities
the authority to restrict the use of buildings for the sale of
alcoholic liquor to certain zones.
125
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Karp v. Zoning
Board of Stamford,126 supported this delegation of authority,
holding that a city's zoning ordinance was not in conflict with
the state's authority to regulate the liquor industry under the
Liquor Control Act.127 The Karp dissenting opinion, however,
argued that the authority delegated to the city was under the
general police power and was not a delegation of Twenty-
First Amendment authority. The dissenting judge asserted
that the city "cannot by ordinance legislate any limitation
upon the exercise of the statutory authority of the [state] li-
quor control commission or direct what it can or cannot ap-
prove. " 128 Regardless of the actual classification of delegated
power, Connecticut courts have recognized that "because of
the danger to public health and welfare inherent in liquor
traffic, the police power to regulate the liquor trade runs
S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)); City of Seattle v. Hinldey, 517 P.2d 592, 594
(Wash. 1973) (power of state to regulate liquor has been extended to cities and
municipalities to the extent specified by statute); Corral, Inc. v. Washington
State Liquor Control Bd., 566 P.2d 214, 217 (Wash Ct. App. 1977) (legislature
authorizes municipalities and counties to adopt police ordinances and regula-
tions that are "not in conflict" with state power).
124. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-44 (West 1993) ("The department of liquor
control shall refuse permits for the sale of alcoholic liquor (1) in no-permit
towns and (2) where prohibited by the zoning ordinance of any city or town.");
Karp v. Zoning Bd. of Stamford, 240 A.2d 845, 850 (Conn. 1968) (statutory man-
date that zoning ordinances must be complied with before permit can be
granted); Town of Greenwich v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 469 A.2d 382 (Conn.
1983) (holding that the Liquor Control Commission must refuse liquor permits
where prohibited by zoning ordinance).
125. State ex rel. Haverback v. Thomson, 57 A.2d 259, 261 (Conn. 1948)
(holding that municipalities do not, however, have the delegated authority to
limit the number of liquor outlets in the town as a whole).
126. 240 A.2d 845 (Conn. 1968).
127. Id. at 847.
128. Id. at 852 (House, J. dissenting).
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broad and deep, more so than comparable regulatory powers
over other activities."' 29
Washington is another example of a state where there
appears to be some discrepancy between state courts regard-
ing the interpretation of the extent of power delegated to local
government under the state's liquor control law. In City of
Seattle v. Hinkley,13 0 the Washington Supreme Court upheld
the validity of a Seattle ordinance prohibiting nudity of fe-
male employees in bars and taverns.' 3 1 The court explained
that "the valid power of the state to promulgate liquor regula-
tions has been extended to cities and municipalities to the
extent specified" by two state statutory provisions. 132 The
court's language, which "extends" the state's "power to pro-
mulgate liquor regulations" to local authorities, appears to be
a delegation of the state's Twenty-First Amendment power.
In a subsequent Washington state case, Corral, Inc. v.
State Liquor Control Board,13 3 the same two statutes dis-
cussed in Hinkley were at issue. The court in this case
agreed that "the valid power of the state to promulgate liquor
regulations has been extended to local authorities to the ex-
tent specified by both these statutes."3 4 The court noted that
section 66.28.080, which authorized the regulation of music,
dancing, or entertainment on the licensed premises, was not
a grant of any power. 13 5 The second statute, on the other
hand, "merely extends to municipalities and counties the
power to adopt police ordinances and regulations 'not in con-
flict' with" state statutes or Board regulations. 3 6 The court's
129. Williams v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 399 A.2d 834, 835 (Conn. 1978)
(citing Viola v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 260 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1969)); Miller v.
Zoning Comm'n of Bridgeport, 65 A.2d 577, 578 (Conn. 1949) ("[Plower of the
state, or any subdivision thereof authorized to act in the matter, to regulate and
restrict the business of the sale of liquor is far broader than a power to regulate
or restrict ordinary lawful business.").
130. 517 P.2d 592 (Wash. 1973).
131. Id. at 594.
132. Id. (Washington Revenue Code sections 66.08.120 and 66.28.080 pro-
vide that "municipalities and counties shall have [the] power to adopt police
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with this title or with the regulations
made by the board" and that local authorities may issue permits for premises
where music and dancing take place.).
133. 566 P.2d 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977).
134. Id. at 217.
135. Id. at 218.
136. Id. at 217-18 (emphasis added) (discussing Washington Revenue Code
Section 66.08.120).
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language in Corral thus indicates that the state is "merely"
delegating its police power authority to local government, not
delegating its power to regulate liquor under the Twenty-
First Amendment.
Determining exactly which power is being delegated by
the state is not crucial for most purposes, since generally the
courts will uphold the validity of local land use regulations
not in direct conflict with state statutory provisions. 137 Nev-
ertheless, the distinction between Twenty-First Amendment
authority and general police power authority may become
critical when there is a constitutional challenge to a local or-
dinance. The United States Supreme Court has held that in
matters of liquor regulation, the Twenty-First Amendment
confers "something more than the normal state authority
over public health, welfare, and morals."138 Therefore, courts
may give greater deference to local liquor ordinances where
the municipality's power to regulate is based upon a delega-
tion of the state's Twenty-First Amendment authority rather
than "merely" a delegation of general police power.
4. Local Control With No Preemption
Few states have chosen to delegate completely their au-
thority under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate li-
quor.139 Nevertheless, in Hawaii, the state legislature has
explicitly delegated this authority to county liquor commis-
137. See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text; see also Ronald V.
Sinesio, Annotated, Zoning Regulation of Intoxicating Liquor as Pre-empted by
State Law, 65 A.L.R.4th 555, § 3[g] (1988)("[C]ourts [have] held.., that a mu-
nicipal ordinance which permitted establishments to sell alcoholic beverages
only if the property was located in a use district was a valid exercise of the city's
police power and that nothing in the state liquor law pre-empted a city's zoning
power.").
138. California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
139. See, e.g., MD. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 60 (1993) (liquor license is ap-
proved and issued by county board of license commissioners, except in Balti-
more City, which has its own board of license commissioner; in certain counties,
approval of the city is required); Valentine v. Board of License Comm'rs, 435
A.2d 459, 460 (Md. 1981) (finding that the County Board of License Commis-
sioners is not an agency of the state); Jabine v. Priola, 412 A.2d 1277, 1283 &
n.12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) ("Zoning matters and the regulation of alcoholic
beverages are encompassed by the City's police power.... In maintaining con-
trol over the granting of liquor licenses, the City is exercising the police power
delegated to it by the General Assembly"). But see Montgomery County v.
Board of Supervisors of Elections for Montgomery County, 451 A.2d 1279, 1280
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) ("We think it clear that the Act makes manifest that
the State, and the State alone, shall regulate and control, within Maryland, the
1994]
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sions. 140 The legislature declared that such regulation of li-
quor within a county is a local concern rather than a state
function. 141 When such a complete delegation of Twenty-
First Amendment power has occurred, generally, there will
not be an issue of preemption by the state. In fact, in Hawaii
Government Employees' Ass'n v. County of Maui,142 the court
held that county provisions regarding liquor control super-
seded state laws, which were in conflict. 143 The Hawaii State
Constitution provides that the legislature has the power to
enact laws of statewide concern.14 4 The Hawaii Gov't Court
explained that because liquor control administration is dele-
gated to the counties, this area is no longer a matter of state-
wide concern. 145
Nebraska has also vested authority in local governing
bodies "to regulate and control the manufacture, distribution,
sale and traffic of alcoholic liquor."1 46 The state legislature
has declared its policy "that the business of retailing alcoholic
liquor is a business affected with the public health, safety,
and welfare such that it must be regulated locally. " 147 Unlike
Hawaii, however, the state retains some control by requiring
that the local governing bodies consider requirements and
criteria specified by the Nebraska Liquor Control Act when
taking any liquor licensing action.148  Nevertheless, if the
state is not specifically authorized by statute to take an in-
sale, manufacture, distribution, storage, or transportation of alcoholic
beverages.").
140. HAw. REV. STAT. § 281-17 (1992) ("The liquor commission, within its
own county, shall have the sole jurisdiction, power, authority, and discretion,
subject only to this chapter: (1) To grant, refuse, suspend, and revoke any
licenses for the manufacture, importation, and sale of liquors . . ").
141. Hawaii Gov't Employees' Ass'n v. County of Maui, 576 P.2d 1029, 1040
(Haw. 1978).
142. 576 P.2d 1029 (Haw. 1978) (holding that the state legislature delegated
to the counties the administration of liquor control and state law is superseded
by conflicting provisions of the county).
143. Id. at 1038.
144. RAw. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
145. Hawaii Gov't, 576 P.2d at 1038.
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-116 (1992).
147. Id. § 53-101.01 (statutory statement of policy also notes that the citi-
zens of Nebraska are concerned about "the issuance of additional retail licenses
in areas already adequately served by existing retail licensees").
148. Id. §§ 53-134, 53-134.02. ("Local governing bodies shall only have au-
thority to approve applications and deny licenses pursuant to [the criteria spec-
ified in] the Nebraska Liquor Control Act.").
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dependent licensing action, the municipality is free to legis-
late in the area and the state may not intervene.
149
5. The Local Option
A local option law authorizes a state subdivision to deter-
mine whether to adopt a restrictive or prohibitive liquor li-
censing law within its locality.150 This determination is not
made by traditional legislative enactment, but is instead car-
ried out by a popular vote of the people.1 51 The local option
principle is discussed in this section as a supplement to the
four jurisdictional models, since it may be available in a par-
ticular state regardless of the way jurisdictional control is
divided.
Local option provisions are found in forty-two states and
the District of Columbia. 152 Only eight states-Arizona, Cal-
149. Jetter v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 283 N.W.2d 5, 6 (Neb. 1979)
(holding that the Nebraska Liquor Control Act does not specify authority for the
state commission to revoke or cancel a license; therefore, the court held that the
state's cancellation of a license was an invalid action).
150. Malito v. Marcin, 303 N.E.2d 262, 265 (111. App. Ct. 1973).
151. Id.
152. ALA. CODE § 28-2-1 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (procedure for elections to de-
termine classification of counties as wet or dry counties); Id. § 28-2A-1 (proce-
dure for elections to determine classification of municipalities as wet or dry mu-
nicipalities); ALASKA STAT. §§ 04.11.190, 04.11.492 (1994) (prohibition of the
sale of alcoholic beverages based upon vote in municipality or established vil-
lage); ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-8-202 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-140
(Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-10 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); DEL.
CONST. of 1897, art. XIII, § 1 (amended 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-118 (1991 &
Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 567.01 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE
ANN. § 3-4-40 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 23-917 (1987 & Supp.
1994) (referendum for local option); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 235, para. 5/9-2 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (referendum on retail sales of alcoholic liquor); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 7.1-3-23-21 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994) (state commission must revoke a retail
permit if 66% of the voters petition for revocation based upon evidence of per-
mittee's conviction of a violation of a provision of this title); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-302 (1964 & Supp. 1993) (city may elect not to license the sale of alcoholic
liquor by the package in such city); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 242.020 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 582 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1994) (local option election allowed in any ward or incorporated munici-
pality); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 121 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (local
option in a municipality); MD. ALcO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 37 (1993) (local option
authorized in Poolesville within Montgomery County); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 138, § 8 (West 1976 & Supp. 1994); MICH. CONST. of 1963 art. IV, § 40 (as
amended) (county may vote to prohibit sale of alcoholic beverages); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 340A.416 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-11 (1972 &
Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.140 (Vernon 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-
1-205 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-122 (1993) (city or village may elect to re-
strict licensing the sale of alcoholic liquor either by the drink or in the original
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ifornia, Hawaii, Iowa, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah,
and Wyoming-do not include local option provisions within
their state statutes.153 Local option laws grant extensive li-
quor regulation control to localities and avoid conflicts which
are present in other jurisdictional schemes. This broad state
delegation of power to local citizens side-steps preemption
problems. Furthermore, procedural due process problems are
also avoided because the decision to prohibit liquor in a par-
ticular locality is based on popular vote and is, therefore, con-
sidered to be legislative in nature.
1 5 4
For example, in Philly's v. Byrne,'55 Chicago citizens
voted to make their precinct "dry" under Illinois' local option
liquor law.1 56 As a result of this vote, any license to sell li-
quor in the precinct lapsed automatically 30 days after the
election.' 5 ' The licensees in the case, who owned a restau-
package, or both); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:7 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-
44 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (municipal referendum on retail sales of alcoholic
beverages except brewed malt and fermented wine); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-5A-1
(Michie 1994); N.Y. ALco. BEV. CoNT. LAw § 142 (McKinney 1993) (local option
for cities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1004 (1943 & Supp. 1994) (city or county may
adopt ordinance restricting the hours of retail sale of malt beverages, unforti-
fied wine, and fortified wine); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.32 (Anderson 1989
& Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 590 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(county must approve by election the sale of alcoholic beverages by the individ-
ual drink for on- premises consumption); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.506 (1993); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-472 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-5-2 (1989 & Supp. 1993);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-3-8 (1992 & Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-
3-106 (Supp. 1994) (county voters by local option election may permit or forbid
the manufacture, receipt, sale, storage, transportation, distribution and/or pos-
session of alcoholic or intoxicating beverages within the territorial limits of
such county); TEx. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 251.01 (West Supp. 1994) (local op-
tion election authorized at county, city, justice precinct, or town level to deter-
mine whether or not the sale of alcoholic beverages shall be prohibited or legal-
ized); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 161 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-45 (Michie 1993)
(local option election permitted in county, city or town); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 66.40.020 (West 1985); W. VA. CODE § 60-5-1 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 125.05
(West Supp. 1994).
153. Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. Rptr. 166, 168
(Ct. App. 1970) (before Prohibition, California permitted local option, but with
repeal, California "chose not to reinstate this local option and control was put
under state regulation"); 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 32 (1983).
154. See, e.g., Philly's v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 94 (7th Cir. 1984) ("referendum
is a constitutionally permissible method of regulating the local sale of liquor[,]"
assuming that the referendum is conducted fairly and honestly and the proce-
dure does not deprive plaintiffs of property without due process of law).
155. 732 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1984).
156. Id. at 89.
157. The Philly's court applied Article IX of the Illinois Liquor Control Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 43 at 166, which provides that:
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rant in the precinct, lost their license as a result of the refer-
endum, and alleged that they were denied property without
due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 55 Judge Posner explained in the majority opinion
that, because the referendum was a legislative procedure, no-
tice and opportunity for a hearing was not required.' 59
Therefore, the licensees were not denied procedural due pro-
cess in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16
0
Local option liquor laws have also been unsuccessfully
challenged as a violation of equal protection, 16 1 an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority, 162 and as a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law.163 The Ohio court in Scioto
Trails Co. v. Department of Liquor Control164 rejected the
constitutional challenges of due process and equal protection
explaining that:
[Pilaintiffs accepted the liquor permit and commenced op-
eration of the permit premises, including the sale of intox-
icating liquors there, with the knowledge and understand-
ing that the statutes of Ohio . . provide for the
termination of the sale of intoxicating liquors at that loca-
[U]pon the filing, at least 90 days before the next regularly sched-
uled general election, of a petition signed by 25 percent or more of a
precinct's registered voters, the question whether to ban the retail sale
of alcoholic beverages in the precinct shall be placed on the ballot at
the election. (Except in cities of more than 200,000 people, the electoral
unit is the entire city, town, or village, rather than the individual pre-
cinct .... If the vote is to ban, any license to sell liquor in the precinct
lapses automatically 30 days after the election.
Philly's, 732 F.2d at 89 (citation omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 92-93.
160. Philly's v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 93 (7th Cir. 1984). "[A]lthough the appel-
lants did not have notice or an opportunity for a hearing in the sense familiar in
adjudicative proceedings, they of course had ample notice of the forthcoming
election and an opportunity to campaign against the proposition that the pre-
cinct should vote itself dry." Id.
161. See Scioto Trails Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 462 N.E.2d 1386,
1390-91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); see generally Shelley Saxer, License to Sell: Con-
stitutional Protection Against State or Local Government Regulation of Liquor
Licensing, HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript on file with
author).
162. Malito v. Marcin, N.E.2d 262, 265 (1973) (finding the local option not an
unlawful delegation of power because the legislature decided that liquor sales
can be prohibited and voters only determine whether these legislative provi-
sions become operative in any given precinct).
163. Id. (holding that liquor licensing is a privilege, not a right subject to
protection against a regulatory taking).
164. 462 N.E.2d 1386 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
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tion through the exercise of local option by means of a lo-
cal-option election.
16 5
Therefore, the plaintiffs were not deprived of a property right
because, by accepting the license, they consented to the condi-
tion that the voters could elect to designate the area dry.
166
The court also pointed out that, under Ohio law, the licensee
does not lose the permit as a result of a local option election
and, therefore, has not been deprived of a right because the
permit can be transferred either to another person or to an-
other location.167 "As far back as 1904, the Supreme Court
declared that the power Of a state to pass a local option law 'is
not an open question.' ,168 Thus, the local option concept may
be an effective and constitutionally-accepted strategy to allow
local citizens to prohibit the sale of liquor in their community.
B. Local Regulation and Preemption
In addition to using delegated authority under the
Twenty- First Amendment to control liquor sales, local gov-
ernments may enact ordinances under their general police
power to regulate the locations where alcoholic beverages are
sold.' 69 This local regulation may be allowed under the state
statutory scheme1 70 or by court determinations that local au-
thorities have the power under their general police power to
pass zoning ordinances affecting liquor stores. 17  Neverthe-
165. Id. at 1390.
166. Id. at 1389.
167. Id. at 1391.
168. McDonald v. Brewer, 295 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (quoting
Lloyd v. Dollision, 194 U.S. 445, 448-49 (1904)).
169. Floresta, Inc. v. City Council of San Leandro, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182, 186 (Ct.
App. 1961) ("[Ojrdinance is a geographic restriction as to place of sale and use of
liquor, not an invasion of the state's general regulation and limitation of the
consumption of liquors .... ).
170. See California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
171. See Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 397 S.E.2d 662
(S.C. 1990) (holding that although Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission has
exclusive authority to regulate stores selling alcoholic beverages, municipalities
are not precluded from passing zoning ordinances affecting liquor stores); Ridg-
ley, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 503 N.E.2d 1036, 1037-38 (Ohio 1986)
(holding that where state law provided that liquor permit could not be issued in
contravention of local ordinance, municipal ordinances limiting retail sales of
alcohol were not in conflict with state permit regulations, and were, therefore,
not preempted by operation of state law); see generally City of Billings v.
Laedeke, 805 P.2d 1348, 1352-54 (Mont. 1991) (Hunt, J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing between two types of regulation); Mutchall v. Kalamazoo, 35 N.W.2d
245, 249-50 (Mich. 1948) (distinguishing between two types of regulation).
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less, local ordinances that conflict with state law may be pre-
empted by operation of state law.
172
For example, New York cases typically find that local
regulation is preempted because the "State law indicates a
purpose to occupy [the] entire field of regulation" and the reg-
ulation at issue either duplicates state law or conflicts with
state law. 173 The court in Lansdown Entertainment Corp. v.
New York City Dep't of Consumer Affairs 7 4 determined that
"there [was] a head-on collision between the City ordinance
as it ... applied to establishments also licensed by the State"
where the local regulation restricted the hours of operation-
a subject matter already regulated by the state.' 7- The court
explained that even where a local ordinance merely dupli-
cates a state law, it will be preempted because the state Alco-
172. See Melkonian v. Board of Adjustment, 355 S.E.2d 503 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987) (ruling that the decision of the state Alcoholic Beverages Control Com-
mission to grant a beer license for a proposed tavern preempted the Town zon-
ing board's denial of special exception use permit for the operation of the tav-
ern). See also People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that the
State of New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law preempts all local regula-
tion). But see Sekne v. Portland, 726 P.2d 959, 961 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (finding
that the state liquor statutes do not preempt local ordinance prohibiting nude
dancing in places licensed to sell liquor since state statutes "do not forbid or
allow nude dancing or nudity or address whether those activities are lewd or
criminal"); Davidson v. Clinton, 826 F.2d 1430, 1435 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
that a zoning ordinance, which prohibited sale of beer within five hundred feet
of public school, was a "valid and reasonable exercise of the City's police
power"); Puntureri v. Pittsburgh, 84 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951) ("Mu-
nicipalities may in the exercise of their police power regulate certain occupa-
tions which are in addition to and not in conflict with statutory regulations by
the imposition of supplementary restrictions.") (citing Western Pa. Restaurant
Ass'n v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1951)).
173. Lansdown Entertainment Corp. v. New York City Dep't of Consumer
Affairs, 543 N.E.2d 725, 727 (N.Y. 1989); see also De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d at 1262
(finding local law preempted by state Alcoholic Beverage Control Law because
the regulatory scheme is "comprehensive and detailed"); Town of Onondaga v.
Hubbell, 170 N.E.2d 231 (N.Y. 1960) (finding that a zoning ordinance prohibit-
ing extension of a nonconforming use involving a snack bar selling beer was
preempted by beer license obtained from the state); Tad's Franchises, Inc. v.
Pelham Manor, 345 N.Y.S.2d 136 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 319 N.E.2d 202 (N.Y.
1974) (finding a local zoning ordinance invalid insofar as it allowed use of prop-
erty for service of food and drink, but not alcoholic beverages); Grundman v.
Town of Brighton, 150 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1955) (local ordinance with greater dis-
tance requirement than that required by state statute preempted).
174. 543 N.E.2d 725 (N.Y. 1989).
175. Id. at 726-27 (citing People v. De Jesus, 430 N.E.2d 1260 (N.Y. 1981)).
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holic Beverage Control Law indicates an intent to occupy the
entire field of regulation. 17 6
The conditional use or special use permit is a zoning
technique employed when a particular land use may be ap-
propriate in a zoning district, but special review is required to
determine whether the use will have an adverse impact on
the neighborhood. 177 Examples of land uses that may be con-
sidered conditional are gas stations, apartments in single-
family residential districts, and hospitals.77 Liquor sales lo-
cations may also require special review as a conditional use.
Los Angeles, in particular, has used this approach to exercise
local control in a state which retains exclusive Twenty-First
Amendment power over liquor licensing.' 79 Generally, the
ordinance will identify the findings or conditions necessary to
obtain special permission for a use that is not regularly al-
lowed under the basic zoning provisions, but that is essential
or desirable for the welfare of the community..8 0 Included
within the local board's authority to grant special or condi-
tional use permits is the power to attach reasonable condi-
tions on granting them.' 8 1 Because special uses are explicitly
176. Id. at 727 (here the local ordinance was in direct conflict with the state
law and was, therefore, preempted).
177. DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.49 (2d ed. Michie 1988).
178. Id.
179. See infra notes 180-225 and accompanying text. For example, a Los An-
geles ordinance requires that a new liquor outlet obtain a $3,000 conditional-
use permit ("CUP"), even if the owner has already been issued a California ABC
license. Tranquada, supra note 6, at N1.
180. See Deffenbaugh Indus., Inc. v. Potts, 802 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (finding that a special use is beneficial to the community even though it
may be incompatible with the neighborhood unless certain conditions are met,
and that such a use may be permitted with attached conditions defined by the
ordinance). A special or conditional use differs from a variance in that a vari-
ance requires a showing of unnecessary hardship in not being allowed a use
that is otherwise prohibited, while a special use is allowed in the particular
zone as long as certain requirements are met. But see Cannon v. City of Syra-
cuse, 340 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1973) (finding that since state had preempted local con-
trol over alcoholic beverages, city zoning regulation, which required a special
permit before premises could be used to dispense alcoholic beverages, was pre-
empted by state law).
181. ANDERSON, supra note 8, § 21.30, at 748 (citing Nathanson v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 289 A.2d 881 (D.C. 1972)) (stating that
reasonable conditions may be applied to insure that the grant of a special excep-
tion will be in harmony with zoning regulations and will not tend to injure the
use of nearby property); Pearson v. Shoemaker, 202 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1960) (find-
ing that the zoning board has inherent power when granting a special permit to
impose reasonable conditions and restrictions directly related to proposed use of
property if not in conflict with provisions of local ordinance).
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provided for in these ordinances, a permit may not be denied
unless the denial is based on grounds identified in the ordi-
nance,18 2 and conditions may not be attached if they do not
serve a zoning purpose.'" 3
Recently, a California Court of Appeals had occasion to
consider whether a Los Angeles ordinance governing condi-
tional use permits was preempted by state law.1 8 4 As dis-
cussed above in section A, part 1, California gives deference
to local zoning authority by providing that a liquor license
will not be issued if it "is contrary to a valid zoning ordinance
of any county or city."' 8 5 In 1985, the City of Los Angeles
enacted an ordinance which required that a conditional use
permit be obtained for off-site liquor sales anywhere in the
city. 181 In addition, a specific plan was adopted by the City in
1987 for control of liquor sales in South Central Los Ange-
les. 1 7 Businesses dispensing alcohol, which operated before
the 1985 conditional use ordinance or the 1987 specific plan,
were "grandfathered" and "deemed approved" for such a con-
ditional use.' 8
8
A number of the City of Los Angeles' retail liquor estab-
lishments were "grandfathered" and, thus, approved for oper-
ation under the new ordinances. 8 9 When some of these same
businesses were damaged or destroyed in the Los Angeles ri-
ots, however, the approval for their rebuilding, was made con-
tingent upon their agreement to conditions that would be re-
182. See ANDERSON, supra note 8, § 17.47, at 131.
183. See Kulak v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 563 A.2d 978 (Pa. Cdsmmw. Ct. 1989);
Hoo Chung v. Blase, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11859, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17,
1987) (holding that conditions imposed on the renewal of a liquor license must
have a rational relationship to the benefit sought, and that a condition that a
strip of property be given to the state transportation department without com-
pensation in order to receive renewal is not so related); ANDERSON, supra note 8
§ 21.32, at 756 ("[a]bsent specific authority in the ordinance, a board may not
impose conditions which relate to the detailed conduct of the applicant's busi-
ness rather than to zoning limitations on use of the land").
184. Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of Los Angeles (KALAF), 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, S039481, 1994 Cal. LEXIS
3928 (Cal. July 14, 1994).
185. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23790 (West 1993).
186. KALAF, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 534.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing L.A. MUN. CODE § 12.24 F).
189. Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of Los Angeles (KALAF), 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 535 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, S039481, 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 3928 (Cal. July 14, 1994).
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quired under an application for a new conditional use. 19 0
Some of the conditions required for rebuilding approval pro-
vided that the owner "agree to remove graffiti promptly, pro-
vide adequate lighting, remove trash, provide a security
guard, and in some instances, limit hours of operation."191
Other conditions required "stopping sales of small quantities
of ice and cups that some patrons use to drink on the street,
.. removing a pay telephone to prevent it from becoming a
conduit for drug sales,"'92 limiting the floor space devoted to
alcohol, prohibiting sales of single cans or bottles, locating al-
cohol displays at the back of the store, limiting advertising in
print media and on billboards, regulating the distance be-
tween outlets, and banning outlets near schools, parks or
churches. 193
Application of the conditional use process can have dire
consequences for small businesses attempting to rebuild after
the riots. The Korean community, in particular, suffered se-
vere damage in west and south Los Angeles during the ri-
ots. 19 4 Twenty-three months after the riots, only six of the
175 Korean damaged stores were back in operation. 1 95 In Ko-
rean American Legal Advocacy Foundation v. City of Los An-
geles (KALAP),1 9 6 the plaintiffs challenged the City's condi-
tional use process arguing that it should not be applied to
retail liquor outlets destroyed or damaged by the civil distur-
bance. 197 The'plaintiffs also asserted that the City's ordi-
nances were preempted by state statutory and constitutional
provisions. 198
In response to the argument that the state preempted
the ordinances, the court agreed that the California Constitu-
190. Id. (citing L.A. MUN. CODE § 12.24 G(3)).
191. Id. at 535. In addition, the City also provided for revocation hearings
whereby the City could revoke or condition the approved conditional use if the
business was determined to either be, or threaten to become, a nuisance. Id. at
538 (citing L.A. MUN. CODE § 12.24 J).
192. James Rainey, 4 Liquor Stores Destroyed in Riots Get OK to Rebuild,
L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 1992, at B4.
193. Gottesman, supra note 3, at J1.
194. Evans, supra note 2, at 266.
195. Sandra Hernandez, Community News: Court Ruling Buoys Liquor Store
Foes, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1994, at 9, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
File.
196. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, S039481, 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 3928 (Cal. July 14, 1994).
197. Id. at 535.
198. Id.
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tion gives exclusive jurisdiction to the California ABC to reg-
ulate alcohol. 199 The court, however, found that the condi-
tions imposed by the ordinances "do not directly, or have as
their effect, the regulation of alcohol licenses, nor regulation
of the manufacture, sale, purchase, possession or transporta-
tion of alcoholic beverages."2 ° ° Instead, the court determined
that the purpose of the City's conditional use ordinance was
to "abate or eradicate nuisance activities in a particular geo-
graphic area by imposing conditions aimed at mitigating
those effects. These are typical and natural goals of zoning
and land use regulations."20 1
Los Angeles' ordinances may very well result in a restric-
tion or even prohibition of alcohol sales by businesses that
are subject to the conditional use process.20 2 Not many small
business owners can afford to hire security guards, limit their
hours of operation, and abide by other such restrictions on
their trade.203 As a result, retail liquor outlets required
under the ordinances to obtain a conditional use permit may
ignore the conditions imposed, since such conditions make it
difficult to compete with existing outlets that are not subject
to the same restrictions.20 4 Regardless, the court in KALAF
concluded that the ordinances did not act as a total prohibi-
tion on alcohol sales, and found that they were "not expressly
preempted by state law."20 5
The plaintiffs in KALAF claimed alternatively that even
if the ordinances did not contradict state law, they were pre-
empted because they imposed conditions on a licensee that
duplicated state law provisions allowing the California ABC
199. Id. at 536.
200. Id. at 538.
201. Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of Los Angeles (KALAF), 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 538 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, S039481, 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 3928 (Cal. July 14, 1994) (citing Floresta, Inc. v. City Council, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (Ct. App. 1961)).
202. Id. at 539.
203. Id. (the plaintiffs' claimed that ordinances prohibited alcohol sales be-
cause conditions imposed were "prohibitively expensive for the typical small
business operation").
204. Lacey, supra note 5, at Al (one store owner states that she is willing to
go to court if forced to adhere to the conditions since "[tihere's no way I [store
owner] could survive financially if I operated under the permit guidelines ...
[because] my competitors in the neighborhood don't have those kinds of
restrictions").
205. KALAF, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540.
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to regulate nuisance activities.2 °6 A recent California case of-
fers an example of the California ABC's exercise of authority
to regulate nuisance activities. In Yu v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Board,20 7 the ABC revoked a retail liquor li-
cense in Salinas on the grounds that such a license was "con-
trary to public welfare and morals."208 The retail market lost
its off-site beer and wine license because the California ABC
determined that the premises were a public nuisance due to
"drug transactions, fighting and disorderly conduct, distur-
bances, stolen property, loitering, and suspicious
circumstances. 2 °9
Section 11 of Article XI of the California Constitution
provides that the exercise of local power shall not "conflict"
with general state laws.21 ° The term "conflict" is not limited
to situations where there is a conflict in language, but applies
also to a conflict of jurisdiction which may result from dual
regulations covering the same terrain.211 The court in
KALAF agreed that "superficially" the City's ordinances ap-
peared to overlap with the state law nuisance control provi-
sions, but found that the California ABC did not intend to
"exercise sole and exclusive authority to abate nuisances on
premises licensed for off-site sales of alcoholic beverages."212
The court in KALAF also held that the plaintiffs were not
immune from compliance with the conditional use ordi-
nances, even though the businesses were in existence at the
time the City enacted the ordinances.213 Section 23790 of the
ABCA provides for grandfathering as long as there has not
206. Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of Los Angeles (KALAF), 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 540 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, S039481, 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 3928 (Cal. July 14, 1994). "[U]nder sections 23800 and 23801 [of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act], the ABC may impose conditions on a licensee
[such as] hours of sale, display of signs .... and the personal conduct of the
licensee." Id. The California ABC, under section 24200, has the right to sus-
pend or revoke a liquor license if a merchant does not abate or control nuisance
activities on the licensed or immediately adjacent premises. Id.
207. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1992).
208. Id. at 282.
209. Id.
210. CAL. CONST art. XI, § 11.
211. Abbott v. Los Angeles, 349 P.2d 974, 979-80 (Cal. 1960).
212. Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of Los Angeles (KALAF), 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 540-41 (Ct. App. 1994), review denied, S039481, 1994 Cal.
LEXIS 3928 (Cal. July 14, 1994).
213. Id. at 544.
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been a break in continuous operation.2 14 Because the
grandfathered stores were destroyed in the riot, they were
not operated continuously and the court found that they did
not qualify under the "act of God" exception.215
A similar state preemption issue was decided in North
Carolina, yielding different results. In In re Melkonian, the
Court of Appeals held that a local decision denying a liquor
licensee a special use permit to operate a tavern was pre-
empted by the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission
("North Carolina ABC").2 16 Analogous to California's statu-
tory scheme, North Carolina retains exclusive state control
over liquor regulation, although the North Carolina ABC
Commission may consider local objections and zoning laws.217
The state exercises sole discretion to determine the fitness of
the applicant, the number of outlets permitted in a locality,
and whether the liquor permit should be revoked or sus-
pended for cause. 21 8 The court in In re Melkonian held that
if the North Carolina ABC Commission decides to grant an
214. California Business & Professions Code section 23790 provides:
No retail license shall be issued for any premises which are located
in any territory where the exercise of the rights and privileges con-
ferred by the license is contrary to a valid zoning ordinance of any
county or city. Premises which had been used in the exercise of those
rights and privileges at a time prior to the effective date of the zoning
ordinance may continue operation under the following conditions:
(a) The premises retain the same type of retail license within a
license classification.
(b) The licensed premises are operated continuously without sub-
stantial change in mode or character of operation.
For purposes of this subdivision, a break in continuous operation does
not include:
(1) A closure for not more than 30 days for purposes of repair, if
that repair does not change the nature of the licensed premises
and does not increase the square footage of the business used
for the sale of alcoholic beverages.
(2) The closure for restoration of premises rendered totally or par-
tially inaccessible by an act of God or a toxic accident, if the
restoration does not increase the square footage of the busi-
ness used for the sale of alcoholic beverages.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23790 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
215. KALAF, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543 (civil disturbance involved "affirma-
tive[,] willful or accidental acts of human beings" and was therefore not an "act
of God").
216. In re Melkonian, 355 S.E.2d 503, 509 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
217. Id. at 508-09 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-901 (1943 & Supp. 1994)).
North Carolina falls within the second model of Twenty-First Amendment
power delegation. See supra note 75.
218. Melkonian, 355 S.E.2d at 508-09.
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applicant a liquor permit, the local authority may not deny a
special use permit based on the applicant's lack of fitness.219
Thus, in North Carolina, state law preempts a special use
permit denial when it "attempt[s] to regulate the sale of alco-
holic beverages."22 ° While the conditional use permit may be
an effective means of allowing local control within a state-
dominated system, the judiciary must support the exercise of
local power by determining that such local regulation is not
preempted.
Other cities in California have also attempted to de-
crease the number of liquor stores by using conditional use
permits and other types of zoning ordinances. Sacramento
has attempted to manage its liquor problems by increasing
local control over stores where customers cause public nui-
sances and by requiring permits from older stores that ex-
pand or change their business.22 ' Since 1987, Sacramento
has required all new liquor outlets and bars to obtain special
permits to sell alcohol.222 Under this system, the city can
hold public hearings, impose tougher conditions, or eventu-
ally revoke a liquor permit if alcohol- related problems persist
at the new stores.223 Recently, the city proposed an amend-
ment to the 1987 ordinance that would affect stores in busi-
ness before 1987.224 This amendment would give the city the
same control over older stores as it currently has over new
outlets for dealing with alcohol-related problems such as
noise, littering, loitering, or public drunkenness. 225
In another California city, San Marino, the zoning laws
prohibit bars and also prohibit restaurants from selling alco-
holic beverages.226 Only three stores in the city have a state
license to sell alcohol, but consumption on their premises is
prohibited.227 Although this apparent "blanket prohibition"
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Deb Kollars, Tougher Rules For Liquor Stores Head For City Council





226. Berkley Hudson, Critics Assail Plan to Loosen Liquor Laws, L.A. TIMES,
June 7, 1992, at J1.
227. Id.
164 [Vol. 35
DOWN WITH DEMON DRINK
has not yet been attacked in court,228 San Marino's municipal
code provides that if the ban is ever invalidated, another sec-
tion of the code would "[require] conditional use permits for
commercial ventures within 300 feet of a residential zone.
City officials say that all the city's commercial areas are
within 300 feet of homes" 229 and would, therefore, require
permits.
Bell City also uses zoning to control the number of liquor
stores in its community. The Bell City Council recently cre-
ated an ordinance requiring 300 feet between each outlet and
then denied a permit to an applicant seeking to build a fourth
liquor store at one intersection.23 °
Cities in the greater Los Angeles area have also been
limiting liquor outlets. For example, in Compton, a one-year
ordinance prohibiting the issuance of new liquor permits was
enacted in April 1991, and in South Gate, an ordinance limits
the number of stores and mini-markets selling liquor.23 1
The success of efforts by California cities in exerting local
control over the liquor store locations in their communities
will depend upon what happens in the state courts and legis-
lature in the future. Recent court decisions have favored lo-
cal control advocates over liquor store owners.232 For exam-
ple, liquor store owners who lost in KALAF were dealt a
severe blow when the California Supreme Court refused to
review the decision.233  However, the "Korean American
market owners and their supporters are organizing a cam-
paign to help enact a state law to overcome their plight."
23 4
The "liquor lobby in California is [also] fighting to stop local
228. Id. (State Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control maintains that
such restrictions are outside the scope of city power).
229. Id.
230. Gottesman, supra note 3, at J1.
231. Id.
232. See Zamora, supra note 61 (Oakland ordinance taxing liquor stores and
bars held enforceable by the First District Court of Appeal in San Francisco
after initially being blocked by a superior court judge).
233. Geoff Boucher, Koreatown; Korean Grocers Face Legal Setback, L.A.
TIMES, July 24, 1994, at City Times 11 ("Koreatown-based advocacy organiza-
tion received a major setback last week in its campaign to help grocers escape
city regulations imposed on rebuilding efforts after the 1992 riots.").
234. K. Connie Kang, Store Owners to Fight Restrictions on Reopening, L.A.
TIMES, July 21, 1994, at B3. The Korean American community is being en-
couraged to lobby politicians to pass Assembly Bill 1974, which was approved in
the Assembly in 1993, but which was placed on inactive status at Mayor Rior-
dan's request prior to being presented to the state Senate. Id. This measure
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governments from placing any restrictions on liquor
stores."2 35 In the meantime, anti-alcohol groups and commu-
nity-based operations such as Oakland's Coalition on Alcohol
Outlet Issues are considering a "statewide initiative to give
cities more control over nuisance and crime problems stem-
ming from liquor outlets."23 6 Supporters of local control have
realized major victories through recent legislative activity
strengthening community control over liquor outlets and Cal-
ifornia ABC enforcement authority.23 7
Where authority to control liquor licensing actions has
not been delegated to local government under the Twenty-
First Amendment, the general police power to regulate for
the public health, safety, morals and welfare can be an effec-
tive device to facilitate local control. This power can be used
to regulate liquor stores' land use by employing conditional
use permits and other zoning techniques, provided the regu-
lations are not preempted by state law.
C. Current Statutory Strategies for Controlling
Overconcentration of Liquor Outlets
Sharing state and local control through local input, ap-
proval, licensing or regulation, and utilizing local option laws
and special or conditional use permitting, are strategies that
may help combat liquor store overconcentration. States have
also attempted to control liquor store density by establishing
legislative limits on the number of outlets that are al-
lowed. 23 1 These limits, however, have not necessarily been
would exempt liquor store owners, burned out in the riots, from the special con-
ditions imposed on them by the Los Angeles regulations. Id.
235. Opinion, supra note 3, at G2.
236. Ronningen, supra note 23, at A19.
237. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., ALA.sKA STAT. § 04.11.400 (1994); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 23817 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.20 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.19(c) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 16-4-201 (1993); Kallay's Inc. v. Katona, 209 A.2d 185 (Conn. 1965) (holding
that local zoning ordinance may place limitations on the number of outlets in a
particular zone). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-40 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994)
(municipality has an option at the local level whether to establish a limit on the
number of retail liquor licenses within its jurisdiction which may be overridden
on appeal to the state); MD. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. § 42 (1993) ("Board of Li-
cense Commissioners for Baltimore City, and the board of license commission-
ers for any county, respectively, shall have full power and authority by rules
and regulations to limit and restrict, in accordance with a definite standard the
number of licenses which they shall consider sufficient for any neighborhood");
[Vol. 35
1994] DOWN WITH DEMON DRINK 167
effective in resolving problems resulting from inner city over-
concentration of liquor stores. For example, in California,
Section 23817 of the Business & Professions Code allows one
liquor store for every 2,500 residents of a county.2 39 Never-
theless, there are no density limitations within each county,
and some neighborhoods may greatly exceed the density limi-
tation as long as the county as a whole complies with the
state maximums.24 ° In addition, this 2,500 limitation only
applies to "general" liquor licenses, which allow distilled li-
quor sales as well as beer and wine sales.241 The California
Legislature has just recently addressed this problem by es-
tablishing a moratorium on issuing "beer and wine" licenses
in many cities and counties to be in effect through 1998.242
Attempts to control the proliferation of liquor outlets,
and their attendant annoyances, are not new. State legisla-
tures have permitted the liquor licensing authority to con-
sider factors such as: whether there is an undue concentra-
tion of liquor outlets in the area; whether there is an excess of
law enforcement problems; or whether additional licenses in
the locality will be detrimental to the interest, morals, safety,
or welfare of the public.243 The California ABC initiated an
Karp v. Zoning Bd., 240 A.2d 845 (Conn. 1968) (holding that town may restrict
use of buildings for the sale of alcoholic liquor to certain zones or districts, but
cannot limit the number of liquor outlets, since that authority is delegated to
the Liquor Control Commission); Hudson Bergen County Retail Liquor Stores
Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 52 A.2d 668 (N.J. 1947) (ruling that the State Alco-
holic Beverage Control Commissioner could reverse orders of city board of com-
missioners granting licenses to conduct package liquor stores).
239. Lacey, supra note 5, at A14.
240. Id. For example, in South Central Los Angeles there is one license for
every 800 residents. Johnson, supra note 5, at A5. In Huntington Park located
in southeast Los Angeles, there is one liquor outlet for every 328 adults. Gott-
esman, supra note 3, at Ji. In Michigan, which also limits the number of liquor
licenses based on population, the provision which limits licenses to "one license
for each 1,500 of population ... does not mean one license for each 1,500 of
population on a statewide basis, but rather refers to allocation of licenses ac-
cording to population of local governmental units." Alexander v. Michigan Li-
quor Control Comm'n, 192 N.W.2d 505, 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
241. Zamora, supra note 61.
242. See supra note 62; Zamora, supra note 61, at A5 ("The moratorium
takes the one-license-per-2,500 residents limit on general licenses and applies it
to beer and wine off-sale licenses.")
243. See MacCarder v. Hemstock, 633 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that the public policy of the state is that the number of permits for the
sale of alcoholic beverages be restricted); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23958
(West 1993) (department may deny an application for a license "if issuance of
such license would tend to create a law enforcement problem, or if issuance
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"undue concentration rule," which prohibits the issuance of
liquor licenses to liquor outlets where a neighborhood's crime
rate is 20% higher in a census tract than in surrounding ar-
eas, and where the number of stores in the neighborhood ex-
ceeds the county's ratio. 244 However, this California ABC
rule has not been as helpful as hoped in communities such as
South Central Los Angeles because: 1) the rule was approved
after many of the licenses were already in place; 2) the rule
can be waived if an applicant demonstrates that the license
will serve "public convenience or necessity,"245 a test easily
would result in or add to an undue concentration of licenses and the applicant
fails to show that public convenience or necessity would be served by such issu-
ance"); Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 498 P.2d 1105 (Cal. 1972)
(holding that license may be denied, suspended or revoked if evidence of a law
enforcement problem is presented); Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Al-
coholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd., 184 Cal. Rptr. 367 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that overconcentration of licenses and unusually high number of crimes consti-
tuted "good cause" for denial of issuance); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-137 (1991)
(before approving or denying an application, the local licensing agency shall
consider evidence regarding the "number, type, and availability of liquor outlets
located in or near the neighborhood under consideration"); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 30-46(a)(3) (1993) (department of liquor control may deny permit if "number
of permit premises in the locality is such that the granting of a permit is detri-
mental to public interest, and, in reaching a conclusion in this respect, the de-
partment may consider the character of, the population of, the number of like
permits and number of all permits existent in, the particular town and the im-
mediate neighborhood concerned, the effect which a new permit may have on
such town or neighborhood or on like permits existent in such town or neighbor-
hood"); Williams v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 399 A.2d 834 (Conn. 1978) (holding
that the Liquor Control Commission may refuse to grant retail permit if
number of permit premises in the locality is detrimental to the public interest).
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-44 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4,§ 543 (1993) (Commission may refuse to issue license if there are "sufficient
licensed premises in the locality"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-115 (1991 & Supp.
1994) (Board may consider "whether issuance of license would create or contrib-
ute to an overconcentration of licensed establishments"); MD. ALCO. BEV. CODE
ANN. §§ 60(f), 60(k) (1993) (in Caroline County and Wicomico County, Board of
License Commissioners must take into consideration "the number of licenses
already issued" before a license is issued); VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-222(A)(3)
(Michie 1993) (state Board may refuse to grant a license if "number of licenses
existent in the locality is such that the granting of a license is detrimental to
the interest, morals, safety, or welfare of the public").
244. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 61.3 (1991) (Undue Concentration). South
Central Los Angeles has more liquor stores than 13 individual states. Rhode
Island has 228 liquor stores in comparison to South Central's number of 728
even though Rhode Island's population is three times that of South Central.
See Johnson, supra note 7, at Al.
245. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 61.3 (1990).
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met by selling groceries in areas with few supermarkets;
24 6
and 3) the licensing limits only apply to hard liquor-there
are no limits on outlets selling beer and wine.
2 47
This "undue concentration" approach has just been legis-
lated by a new California bill, Assembly Bill 2897, effective
January 1, 1995, which will require the state licensing
agency to deny licenses for hard liquor or for beer and wine
outlets "if the area where the store would be located has a
crime rate 20 percent higher than in neighboring areas or if
that area has a higher ratio of licenses to residents than sur-
rounding areas."2 48 Local government will have the burden
of proving that a liquor store or bar licensee deserves exemp-
tion from the rule because it serves a public convenience and
necessity while the California ABC will determine the exemp-
tion for businesses such as restaurants and hotels.249
Distance regulations have also been used to control the
location or concentration of retail liquor outlets to promote
the general health, safety and welfare of a community.
250
246. See Johnson, supra note 7, at Al ("Although cities recognize the need to
stem alcohol-related social ills, they are reluctant to discourage any form of
business in economically blighted neighborhoods").
247. Lacey, supra note 5, at A14. This represents "a holdover from the days
when spirits were viewed as more dangerous than other forms of alcohol." Id.
248. Greg Lucas, Law to Ban New Liquor Licenses, S.F. CHRON, Sept. 20,
1994, at A16.
249. Id.; see supra note 62.
250. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 241.075 (MichieiBobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp.
1994) (retail package liquor license may not be issued if proposed business will
be within 700 feet of a similar establishment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A,
§ 453(1)(C) (West Supp. 1989 & Supp. 1994) (license will not be issued if pro-
posed agency liquor store is within 2.5 miles of an existing state liquor store or
agency liquor store); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-3-440 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (li-
cense may not be granted if business is located "within three hundred feet of
any church, school, or playground situated within a municipality or within five
hundred feet of any church, school, or playground situated outside of a munici-
pality"); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32A-2-101(3)(a), 32A-5-101(5)(a) (Supp. 1994)
(state stores and private club licensee's premises "may not be established
within 600 feet of any public or private school, church, public library, public
playground, or park"); 7-Eleven, Inc. v. McClain, 422 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1967)
(holding that ordinance prescribing more stringent standards for distance re-
quirements was preempted by less rigorous state standards); Cunningham v.
Oklahoma City, 556 P.2d 1078 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a local ordi-
nance prohibiting establishments which sell beer from being located within 600
feet of public school ground was preempted); Abilene Oil Distrib., Inc. v. City of
Abilene, 712 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a city zoning
ordinance was not preempted by a state statute because the city's method of
measurement imposed a higher standard which required a liquor store to be
farther away from a public school than is required by the state).
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Regulations governing the distance a liquor outlet may be lo-
cated from a school have been used to prevent "increased traf-
fic congestion and the increased probability of persons driving
under the influence of alcohol in the immediate area" where
children play or travel.251 Concerns about exposing individu-
als to an undue moral hazard based on the proximity of a li-
quor outlet to certain parts of the community have also ex-
isted for years. For example, in Board of Trustees of
Woodland Union High Sch. Dist. v. Munro,252 neighbors pro-
tested against the location of a liquor outlet near a high
school, explaining that:
[M]inors would find a way of getting it, either by pilfering
it from the store or inducing adults to purchase it, take it
out of the store and give it to the minors; that this would
happen generally when students were attending various
athletic games and contests during evenings such as foot-
ball and basketball games; that the pilfering and illegal
obtaining through intervention of adults would be in-
creased by the propinquity of the market to the school
grounds; that handy access to the liquor supply would in-
crease use of intoxicants by adult attendants at the
games; that minors would obtain liquor more readily at
that market than they would at other markets through
misrepresentation of their ages and having obtained it
would permit its use by themselves and other students.253
While distance regulations have been used to control the
degree of exposure to perceived moral hazards and the nui-
sance problems created by local liquor sales, other regulatory
options have also been employed by communities.
Regulating hours of operation has been one means used
to control some of the nuisance problems created by retail li-
quor businesses.254 Although many such regulations have a
251. Helms v. Texas Alcoholic Bev. Comm'n, 700 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985).
252. 329 P.2d 765, 768 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that the issuance of a
license would not be contrary to public welfare and morals even though pro-
posed premises was located in a residential area).
253. Id. at 768.
254. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-128 (West Supp. 1994) (restricting sales
of liquor on Sundays and various holidays between specified hours); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 30-91 (West Supp. 1994) (extensively limiting hours of operation
of various liquor providing entities and restricting sales on certain holidays);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 353 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) ("State liquor
stores and agency liquor stores may be open for the sale and delivery of liquor
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 1 a.m. in municipalities and unincorporated
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religious origin, as evidenced by restrictions on Sundays and
many Christian holidays,25 states have maintained these
laws for many years based on justifications that go beyond
religious concerns. As aptly expressed by the Connecticut
court in Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State,256 "[t]he consumption of
alcohol in immoderate quantities [impairs physical and
mental skills in many people, and] persons who are intoxi-
cated have a much higher chance of being involved in or caus-
ing highway and recreational accidents resulting in death or
serious injury."257 Such public concerns may be reduced
through the use of hour restrictions and the nuisance effects
may be reduced or eliminated as well. For example, noise
and disorderly conduct on liquor store premises, which offend
neighbors at late hours, would likely be eliminated if stores
are forced to close between approximately the hours of 8 p.m.
to 9 a'm. 25 8
In the New Jersey case, Sea Girt Restaurant v. Borough
of Sea Girt,259 residents voted in favor of a referendum to
limit the sale of liquor in licensed outlets to the hours of 6
a.m. to midnight, seven days a week.26 ° In upholding this ex-
ercise of power by local voters against constitutional chal-
lenges, the Sea Girt court remarked that the voters were
"well suited" to make decisions about the number of hours
liquor may be sold because they are in a position to under-
stand the issues raised by these restrictions.261 The voters
are able to "balance the problems created by alcohol con-
sumption, such as drunk driving, with the inconvenience of
having to travel outside their community to purchase li-
quor."262 Additionally, the local residents can appreciate the
economic concerns of local businesses involved in liquor sales,
as well as the potential revenue impact on the community it-
places that have voted in favor of the operation of state liquor stores under local
option provisions.").
255. See Griswold Inn, Inc. v. State, 441 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1981) (holding that
the restriction of liquor sales on Good Friday violated the U.S. Constitution
since other businesses were entitled to operate on that day).
256. 441 A.2d 16 (Conn. 1981).
257. Id. at 19.
258. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-91 (West Supp. 1993); See generally In
re Ciro's Lounge, Inc., 358 A.2d 141 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
259. 625 F. Supp. 1482 (D.N.J. 1986).
260. Id. at 1484.
261. Id. at 1490.
262. Id. at 1490-91.
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self.26 3 Through the use of distance regulations and restric-
tions on the hours of operation, communities have an oppor-
tunity to reduce nuisance problems and social concerns
associated with the operation of liquor outlets such as vandal-
ism, traffic, noise, and drunk driving.26 4
III. PRIVATE CONTROL
Modernly, control over liquor outlets is primarily based
on public regulation, either at the state or local level, as dis-
cussed in Part I. Nevertheless, local residents may be able to
use private control mechanisms such as nuisance, private law
devices, community activism, and community redevelopment
to increase the quality of life in their neighborhoods.
A. Nuisance
The law of nuisance has historically been used to control
the use a landowner may make of his or her land so that the
landowner's actions do not unreasonably interfere with the
property of a neighbor.26 5 As one of the earliest land use
mechanisms, nuisance has served as the guiding principle for
the acceptance of legislative zoning in this country.266 Over
time, however, it has declined in importance as a land use
263. Id. at 1491.
264. See Patch Enterprises, Inc. v. McCall, 447 F. Supp. 1075 (M.D. Fla.
1978) (holding the reduction in the hours of operation of "bottle clubs" to be
rationally related to the goal of reducing incidents of drunk driving).
265. Many of the state or local liquor regulations recognize the potential of a
nuisance situation occurring on licensed premises, and make provisions for
such occurrences. Effective January 1, 1995, California Assembly Bill 2742 will
give the California ABC the "power to suspend or revoke a liquor store for objec-
tionable conditions taking place on a sidewalk abutting a licensee's premises
where the licensee has failed to take reasonable steps to correct the conditions."
See supra note 62. The liquor licensee will be responsible for nuisances that
occur inside the store, in the parking lot, along the street outside the store, and
even for those nuisances caused in nearby vacant lots. Zamora, supra note 61.
These regulations will not be addressed in this section as they are part of the
public regulation discussion. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-210 (1993); Petras
v. Arizona State Liquor Bd., 631 P.2d 1107 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (finding the
revocation of a liquor license proper under nuisance conditions, such as the
presence of intoxicated and disorderly persons consistently on premises); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-471 (1993); In re Ciro's Lounge, Inc., 358 A.2d 141 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1976) (holding that revocation "upon any other sufficient cause"
includes nuisance activity which disturbs public peace, welfare and morals,
such as noise and disorderly conduct).
266. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 303 (1926) (upholding the
constitutionality of zoning).
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control mechanism since most local governments have
adopted zoning ordinances.26 7
"Land use nuisances are either a nuisance per se or a nui-
sance per accidens."26s A nuisance per se is a nuisance re-
gardless of where it is located,269 while a nuisance per ac-
cidens is a nuisance considered with reference to its location
or other circumstances. 270 Nuisance has been used to penal-
ize those people illegally engaged in the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquor.27 ' Such an illegal land use may be
considered a nuisance per se because it is "prejudicial to pub-
lic morals or dangerous to life or injurious to public rights."2 72
Nonetheless, the lawful operation of a properly licensed retail
liquor outlet cannot be considered a nuisance per se, "since
that which the law authorizes to be done, if done as the law
authorizes, is not such a nuisance."273 Therefore, in the typi-
cal land use nuisance case, the nuisance alleged is per
accidens .274




271. See Cardinal v. United States, 50 F.2d 166, 169 (8th Cir. 1931) ("A land-
lord who knowingly allows liquor to be manufactured on his premises in viola-
tion of law is guilty of maintaining a nuisance in contravention of section 21 of
title 2 of the National Prohibition Act."); Southern Express Co. v. Long, 202 F.
462, 467 (5th Cir. 1913) ("Houses of ill fame, gaming houses, and illegal liquor
stores are public nuisances at common law."); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Miller, 358 F. Supp. 1321, 1328 (D. Kan. 1973) ("all places of any kind where
liquors are sold or given away in violation of Kansas law is declared to be a
common nuisance").
272. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 737 (6th ed. 1991).
273. Collins v. Lanier, 40 S.E.2d 424, 426 (Ga. 1946).
274. MANDELKER, supra note 177, § 4.02. See, e.g., Collins v. Lanier, 40
S.E.2d 424 (Ga. 1946):
[I]t is almost impossible to operate a liquor store out of the corporate
limits of a town, and without police protection, without the consump-
tion of liquor on the premises, and the attendant hilarity, loud and
boisterous talking and shouting, and the noise and confusion of
automobiles coming and going at all hours of night and day; and also
the danger to life and health of the community to have a condition such
as proposed to exist in the community offensive to the senses and ren-
ders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable.
Id. See also Dubois v. Selectmen of Dartmouth, 319 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1974) (finding that a nuisance depends upon the way the business is
conducted and that an injunction for a private nuisance will not be granted
where allegations are only predictions as to conditions such as noise, traffic con-
gestion, and litter).
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When the state or local governing body has licensed a li-
quor outlet and approved its location, an issue arises as to
whether a court may enjoin the approved activity as an un-
reasonable use under the circumstances, in other words, as a
nuisance per accidens.275 Some courts have held that when a
zoning ordinance allows a use, the court may not issue an in-
junction against the nuisance.276 However, most courts have
held otherwise, finding that a court will not be precluded
from holding the use a nuisance per accidens, even if the use
is lawful under the zoning ordinance.277
California, on the other hand, statutorily provides that
an injunction cannot be issued against lawful manufacturing,
commercial, or airport uses unless there is "evidence of the
employment of unnecessary and injurious methods of opera-
tion."278 In Sierra Screw Products v. Azusa Greens, Inc. ,279 a
California court upheld an injunction against the owners and
operators of a public golf course.28 0 The operation of the golf
course was determined to be a nuisance because the design of
the third and fourth fairways tended "to create a danger of
personal injury and property damage to the users of the
plaintiffs' property" from golf balls "striking several of plain-
tiffs' employees, damaging their parked automobiles and
breaking windows."28 1
Although the property's use as a golf course was en-
dorsed by the City of Azusa's conditional use permit, the use
was enjoined based on a finding of nuisance.28 2 The court ex-
plained that "'[t]he manifest purport of the adoption of sec-
tion 731a was to eliminate injunctive relief where the busi-
ness is operated in its appropriate zone and the only showing
is an injury and nuisance to the plaintiff in such opera-
275. See MANDELKER, supra note 177, § 4.10. See also Click v. State, 176
S.W.2d 920 (Ark. 1944) (allowing state to abate defendant's liquor store as a
public nuisance even though other methods outlined under the Alcoholic Con-
trol Act, such as the revocation of the defendant's liquor license or holding of a
local option election, might have been followed).
276. MANDELKER, supra note 177, § 4.10 (citing Kirk v. Mabis, 246 N.W. 759
(Iowa 1933); Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 130 S.E.2d 363 (S.C. 1963)).
277. MANDELKER, supra note 177, § 4.10.
278. Id. (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 731(a) (West 1993)).
279. 151 Cal. Rptr. 799 (Ct. App. 1979).
280. Id. at 806.
281. Id. at 802.
282. Id. at 803.
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tion.' "283 However, the lower court found two conditions on
the golf course which contributed to the plaintiffs' injury and
which could be remedied by fairway redesign and adequate
fencing.28 4 Therefore, the plaintiffs were able to establish
that the owners and operators of the golf course used "unnec-
essary and injurious methods of operation."2 85
In California, local citizens seeking to use nuisance prin-
ciples to shut down a lawful liquor outlet must show that the
store could be operated in a manner that will "reduce the con-
duct or activity causing the nuisance"28 6 and that it is being
operated in an injurious manner. This showing may be possi-
ble, for example, if the outlet is operated pursuant to a condi-
tional use permit and some of the conditions are not being
observed. Recent legislation may also help California citizens
control nuisance liquor outlets.28 7
In Pennsylvania, two recent court decisions have caused
neighborhood taverns to close down after finding their opera-
tion to be a public nuisance. In Commonwealth ex rel. Ness v.
Keystone Sign Co.,288 the court found that a licensed liquor
establishment was a nuisance, even though it did not violate
the Liquor Code and the criminal actions occurred off the li-
censed premises. 2 9 The court agreed that the tavern owner
could not be held responsible for every act committed by a
patron, especially off the premises, but asserted its power to
enjoin a nuisance when the "evidence demonstrates a persis-
tent and continuous disturbing of the peace and good order of
the neighborhood."290 Testimony was presented that "pa-
trons of the bar engaged in conduct such as urinating on the
street and on the property of neighbors, drinking outside of
the tavern, throwing empty beer bottles on the street or on to
a neighbor's property, loud and boisterous conduct including
loud conversation, yelling, arguing, and fighting, as well as
generating loud noises from vehicles especially
283. Id. (quoting Gelfand v. O'Haver, 200 P.2d 790 (Cal. 1948)).
284. Sierra Screw Products v. Azusa Greens, Inc., 151 Cal Rptr. 799, 806 (Ct.
App. 1979).
285. Id.
286. MANDELKER, supra note 177, § 4.10.
287. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
288. 513 A.2d 1066 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
289. Id. at 1067.
290. Id. at 1068.
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motorcycles."29 1 The court found a "causal relationship be-
tween the situation outside the premises and what went on
inside" and held that an injunction should be issued based
upon evidence of a "nuisance in law and in fact" in this case of
"increasing abhorrent conduct by patrons in a once peaceful
neighborhood.... "292
Residents in a Philadelphia neighborhood also com-
plained of a nuisance generated by the operation of a local
tavern in Commonwealth v. Olney Tavern.293 The court en-
joined the operation of the tavern based on evidence that its
operation "resulted in a continuing substantial injury and
detriment to the quality of life in the immediately surround-
ing community."294
Given that zoning regulation is the dominant force in
modern land use control, the law of nuisance may be a rela-
tively ineffective method of managing retail liquor outlet loca-
tions. Nonetheless, individual neighborhoods may be able to
use the law of nuisance as a weapon to close down particular
liquor outlets when state liquor licensing provisions do not
encourage local control or when the neighborhood's political
clout with the local governing authority is lacking.
B. Private Law Devices
Another alternative to using public regulation to control
land use is the use of private law devices such as defeasible
estates and restrictive covenants. Defeasible estates are cre-
ated by the language of a grant, reservation or conveyance,
while covenants and servitudes are based on the language of
a promise.295 When land is transferred pursuant to a grant
291. Id. at 1067.
292. Id. at 1069.
293. 9 Phila. 397 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
294. Id. at 404. The Olney Tavern decision further states:
Resident after resident testified to the continual disturbance and an-
noyance of loud and obnoxious noise emanating from the premises and
the surrounding sidewalks, frequent urination and littering on their
property, and being subjected to obscene and vulgar language, all of
which were perpetrated by patrons of the Olney Tavern. Based on re-
peated incidents, residents have testified to their continuing fear of
having projectiles thrown through their windows and of having their
children, their cars, and/or their houses struck by cars driven by intoxi-
cated patrons of the tavern.
Id.
295. WRIGHT & GITELMAN, LAND USE CASES AND MATERIALS 173 (4th ed.
1991).
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containing language restricting the transferee's use of the
property, the transferee takes ownership with the possibility
of forfeiture if the condition restricting the use is violated.2 96
Because the law abhors forfeitures, using the defeasible
fee as a method of land use control is not favored, nor is it
recommended as a strategy for regulating land use.297
Notwithstanding this admonition, defeasible fees have been
used as a way to restrict property from being used for the sale
of liquor.2 98 However, courts may refuse to apply these re-
strictions by finding changed circumstances or a waiver of the
restriction. For example, the reversionary interest in a defea-
sible fee title was held to be unenforceable in Cole v. Colorado
Springs Co.299 The court ordered title to be quieted in the fee
owner, based upon the doctrine of changed circumstances.3 °0
The court noted that when a condition subsequent contains
the potential to destroy an estate, it is not viewed favorably
by the law. 0 1 Judicial notice was taken of the history of the
growth and development of Colorado Springs, as well as the
fact that there were many liquor outlets already located
within the community.30 2 The grantor of the lots at issue was
also deemed to have "waived and relinquished the right to
enforce the liquor restriction clause of this deed by the con-
duct which was pursued by it with respect to other adjacent
similar lots constituting a portion of the same tract and
plan."30 3
Restrictive covenants have also been used historically to
prevent liquor sales on particular parcels of property.
30 4
These covenants have been found in the forms of both lease-
296. See generally CUNNINGHAM, STOEBUCK AND WHITMAN, LAW OF PROP-
ERTY, § 2.3, (West 1993).
297. See infra note 301.
298. Fusha v. Dacono Townsite Co., 153 P. 226 (Colo. 1915) (holding that a
prohibition clause and condition of forfeiture contained in a deed which re-
stricted the sale of liquor was not violative of the public good or subversive of
the public interests and that the deed was enforceable as a defeasible fee
conveyance).
299. 381 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1963).
300. Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 381 P.2d 13, 18-19 (Colo. 1963).
301. Id. at 16. "Forfeitures are abhorrent to the law, and hence will be con-
strued with great strictness." Id.
302. Id. at 18.
303. Id. at 17.
304. Covenants not to compete have been used to restrict sales of liquor for
purposes of controlling competition. See, e.g., Klein v. Williams, 441 S.E.2d 270
(Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding an injunction against the seller of a liquor store
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hold conveyances and conveyances in fee simple.3 °5 In Jame-
son v. Brown,3 °6 homeowners in a residential neighborhood
obtained an injunction forbidding the sale of alcoholic drinks
within the neighborhood.30 7 The injunction was granted to
enforce a covenant against the liquor sales which had been
incorporated into certain lot conveyances within the land
tract between 1881 and 1889.308 Finding that the enforce-
ment of the covenant was still beneficial to the homeowners
and that the restriction had not been waived or abandoned,
the court upheld the covenant in 1939.309 Not all courts, how-
ever, have upheld restrictive covenants against liquor sales.
Courts have refused to enforce these restrictions when there
are changed circumstances in the neighborhood3 10 or when
there is a lack of uniformity in the lot restrictions as origi-
nally created.31'
Restrictive covenants have been respected by some local
authorities which have refused to transfer a liquor license to
a new location that is subject to a restrictive covenant against
liquor outlets. 1 2 In California, however, a court allowed a
who agreed not to enter into the business of selling liquor in the same town
where the store purchased by the buyer was located).
305. See, e.g., Red Lobster Inns v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 492 F. Supp 933
(E.D. Ark. 1980) (holding that the title insurance company's failure to inform
Red Lobster of a restrictive use covenant prohibiting use of the land as a restau-
rant or a liquor store was a negligent breach of contract); Armstrong v. Shapiro,
196 N.Y.S. 630, 631, 633 (Bronx County Ct. 1922) (holding that although lease
provided that premises were not to be used for a paint store or a liquor store,
the covenant was waived by the landlord based on the landlord's acceptance of
rent), rev'd, 202 N.Y.S. 305 (1923).
306. 109 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
307. Id. at 831.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 832. See also King v. Waigand, 117 A.2d 918, 921 (Md. 1955)
(upholding an 1890 covenant prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors in a sub-
division as enforceable against retail liquor outlet in 1955).
310. Kew Gardens Corp. v. Ciro's Plaza, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (App. Div.
1941) ("The covenant, by reason of changes in the neighborhood, some of them
normal and others resulting from plaintiff's action in releasing under its re-
served right, other property from the same restriction, has become unenforce-
able in equity."); See also In re Giammaria, 70 A.2d 402, 404 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1950) (explaining that although the lot plan prohibited the sale of liquor, the
lower court found ample evidence of waiver and abandonment of the
restriction).
311. McCree v. Pearlman, 182 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.D.C. 1960) (finding a cove-
nant unenforceable because it "lacks universality and is not reciprocal" result-
ing in a "checkerboard realty pattern").
312. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 184 A.2d 387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962) (stating that
state liquor control board refused request for transfer of liquor license because
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license transfer to a location where the deed contained a valid
and enforceable covenant against the sale of liquor.313 The
court explained that the only legislative restriction on the
Board's licensing power was that retail licenses could not be
issued contrary to a valid county or city zoning ordinance. 14
Because the restrictive covenant was a private contract, and
not a public zoning ordinance, the Board was not restricted
from granting a license transfer.3 1 5
Given the distaste courts have for forfeiture of property
rights, the defeasible fee is probably the least effective pri-
vate land use control strategy. On the other hand, restrictive
covenants prohibiting liquor sales on a particular premises
may be respected by courts as enforceable promises. A court
may, however, find that the neighborhood has changed suffi-
ciently to preclude enforcement or may refuse to enforce such
private agreements when they conflict with the state or local
liquor licensing authority.
C. Community Activism
Community activism has been used as an effective tool in
pressuring state or local officials to deny new permits or to
encourage existing store owners to modify their businesses
through reduced hours and other means.3 1 6 For example,
of deed restriction against liquor sales on proposed premises); In re Royal, 155
A.2d 234, 236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959) (holding that board may refuse to issue
license where there is a restriction in the deed to the premises against the sale
of liquor).
313. Board of Trustees v. Munro, 329 P.2d 765, 769-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
314. Id. at 769.
315. Id. at 769-70; see also In re Pittaulis, 282 A.2d 388, 390 (Pa. 1971)
("Board had no discretion to refuse the transfer on the ground that appellant's
paramount lessor may have a contractual right to withhold permission for ap-
pellant to serve alcohol on the demised premises.").
316. Sims, supra note 19, § 3 at 1 (focusing on liquor industry as a whole and
how it targets inner cities as the end of their pipeline of inexpensive malt liquor
and fortified wines); Hotakainen, supra note 15, at 1B (south Minneapolis
neighborhood activists celebrate success in closing down of liquor store after
years of community efforts). Public regulation may also encourage community
activism by expressly providing for consideration of local opinion and wishes of
neighbors. For example, in Ohio, authorities in control of a school or church are
statutorily given the right to a hearing "upon the advisability of the issuance,
transfer of ownership, or transfer of location of" a permit when the proposed
operation is within five hundred feet from their boundaries. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4303.26 (Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1993); First Church of The Naza-
rene v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control, 565 N.E.2d 872, 872 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
("Churches have the right to participate in hearings conducted by the Depart-
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community activists in Pacoima, California recently honored
a local liquor store owner for providing an outstanding exam-
ple of the value of local control over liquor outlets.317 Six
years prior, community activists had demanded that the
store owner's city liquor permit be revoked because the store
was a neighborhood nuisance.318 Under pressure from the
community, the owner agreed to follow self-imposed operat-
ing guidelines that were proposed by the activists. 319 The
owner, a board member of the Korean American Grocers As-
sociation, "said he stopped fighting the protesters and started
working with the community when he realized it was in his
own interest to do so."3 2 0
San Diego community activists also have put pressure on
local liquor stores in order to address the nuisance problems
that they cause. 21 One San Diego liquor store agreed to stop
selling liquor in order to keep the California ABC from revok-
ing its license.2 2 Residents had filed complaints with the
California ABC after becoming "outraged when drunks
tanked up outside the store at 37th Street and National Ave-
nue and began harassing young girls attending St. Jude
Academy." 23 Activists, working with neighborhood residents
and St. Jude's Shrine, had been pushing the California ABC
officials to close the market and liquor store, alleging it was
nuisance. 24 The store owner eventually succumbed to com-
ment of Liquor Control on a proposed transfer, but churches do not have the
right to appeal department decisions or otherwise to compel the department to
take any particular action.").
317. Jim Tranquada, Activists take aim at bill: Local control of liquor stores





321. Opinion, Treating the Blight: Communities Wage War on Drugs, Alco-
hol, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 19, 1994, at B6, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News File.
322. Ronald W. Powell, Troubled City Area Inspired by Priest: Cleric Helps
Revive His Boyhood Home, SAN DIEGO UNION- TRIB., May 14, 1994, at B1; Opin-
ion, Shut them down: Get tougher on nuisance liquor stores, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Mar. 20, 1994, at G2 ("Woody's has long been a bane to the neighbor-
hood-a hangout for street drunks and junkies, its parking lot and the street
littered with wine bottles, malt liquor cans and even hypodermic syringes. Par-
ents were afraid to let their kids walk past it to go to school.").
323. Powell, supra note 322, at B1.
324. Kathryn Balint, Key Meeting About Liquor Store Evaporates, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Dec. 8, 1993, at B3 (one activist claimed "'[tihere's prostitution,
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munity pressure and settled with the California ABC in order
to keep his license, an alienable asset in California.3 2 5 How-
ever, the owner expressed dismay at being "unfairly targeted"
and protested that if he were forced to close down, he would
have to go on welfare. 26
Even young people have taken up the fight against blight
in their communities. Students in South Dallas began a class
project in the fall of 1992 to clean up their neighborhood and
convince city and state authorities to close down liquor stores
that were operating within 1,000 feet of their school in viola-
tion of city law.3 27 The need for this project was expressed by
one South Dallas eighth-grader who described walking past
"drug dealers, prostitutes and drunks" on his way home from
school.328 "Some are begging, some fighting, some swearing
and some urinating on the ground."3 2 9 City officials were un-
able to enforce the distance regulation until a suit filed by the
Liquor Merchants Group was resolved in court.33 0 Only one
owner of the area liquor stores agreed to meet with the stu-
dents. The attorney for this owner explained to the students
that "his employer was trying to maintain a clean and safe
store and contribute to the school's well-being."
331
In Los Angeles, community activism has been effective in
delaying the reconstruction of liquor stores after the riots of
1992. Shortly after the riots, which resulted in the destruc-
tion of about two hundred liquor stores, Democratic Assem-
blywoman Marguerite Archie-Hudson declared that, "we will
boycott out of existence" any liquor businesses that rebuild in
her district.332 Community pressure forced the Los Angeles
City Council "to exclude owners of liquor stores from emer-
drinking on the premises, [and] drunks expose themselves and harass children
at the bus stop' ").
325. See Roehm v. County of Orange, 196 P.2d 550, 552 (Cal. 1948) (holding
that a liquor license has value and may be sold).
326. Id. "'I am alone here, running the store,' he said. 'These people (the
neighborhood activists), I don't know why they hate me like that. I am a Chris-
tian. I have done nothing wrong. I have a family. If they close me down, I'll
have to go on welfare.'" Id.
327. Anna Macias, A Class Project: Students Press City to Oust Liquor Stores
Near S. Dallas School, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 19, 1993, at 23A, available





332. Johnson, supra note 5, at A5.
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gency code exemptions designed to help businesses rebuild
quickly."33 3 Also, in March of 1993, the City Council voted to
rescind the Planning Commission's approval of a permit to
rebuild a liquor store destroyed in the riots.334 The City
Council required the liquor store owner to obtain an environ-
mental impact study before reconsideration of the rebuilding
project. Although this condition was later rejected by the
courts, 5 more than 100 South Los Angeles residents at-
tended the City Council meeting to convey their concern
about the effects of having too many liquor stores in their
neighborhood.3 36 The author of the approved motion, Coun-
cilman Mark Ridley-Thomas, maintained that "[t]his is a 10-
year-plus struggle to get a handle on the overconcentration of
liquor outlets and licenses in south L.A."3 3 7 Activists oppos-
ing local liquor stores acknowledge that closing them down
will not instantly resolve all the crime problems in the area,
but they do believe that the overconcentration of these outlets
is a liability which contributes to attracting and retaining the
criminal element.3 38
Religious leaders and organizations have also actively
participated in resolving problems created by the overconcen-
tration of liquor stores. Ministers in New York have assisted
in redevelopment projects in Harlem by reaching agreements
with developers to prohibit the leasing of commercial proper-
ties in the projects to liquor store owners.3 39 Reverend Glen
Missick, chairman of the Manhattan division of the New York
African-American City-Wide Clergy Council, is even willing
333. Id.
334. Patrick McGreevy, Council Rescinds Approval of Permit to Rebuild Li-
quor Store, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Mar. 24, 1993, at N4, available in WESTLAW,
Papers Database.
335. Which Way L.A., (PBS radio broadcast, Aug. 2, 1994) (Warren Olney
interviewing, attorney for the Korean-American Legal Advocacy Foundation).
336. McGreevy, supra note 334, at N4.
337. Id.
338. Krikorian, supra note 20, at 14. Activist Sylvia Castillo of the Commu-
nity Coalition for Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment explained that:
Since the riots, there is an increased optimism that you can make a
difference, that you can participate in improving the neighborhood ....
That doesn't mean that crime has been wiped out of South-Central or
that if you get rid of all liquor stores, there will be no crime. But it
does mean that if you use land in a way that doesn't attract this crimi-
nal element.., that neighborhoods will change.
Id.
339. Sims, supra note 19, § 3, at 1.
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to try other means, such as demonstrations, to keep liquor
stores out of the redevelopment projects.34 ° Chicago minis-
ters have worked with local politicians and the Nation of Is-
lam to create legislation that would compel some regions to
go dry.341 The group "Standing Up, Taking Back," led by
Reverend Michael Pfleger, has threatened sit-ins and boy-
cotts of liquor stores that fail to comply with liquor laws by
selling to minors or selling individual bottles of beer.342 In
Los Angeles, the 3,000-member Bethel African Methodist
Episcopal Church purchased a liquor store across the street
from its campus and uses it as an economic-development
center.343
Such community activism is not without its foes. The
liquor industry has criticized the efforts of these activists as
paternalistic and hostile towards efforts to expand business
which provides jobs and revenues in areas that desperately
need them.344 Liquor store owners claim that it is "unfair to
blame them for the problems of the inner city."3 45 Liquor
stores are operated in neighborhoods that other businesses
have shunned, and such outlets contribute to the local com-
munity by hiring residents, sponsoring community events
and contributing tax revenue. 46
In California, this battle over local control is being waged
in the courts and in the state legislature. 347 The California
Beverage Retailers Coalition recently filed a suit to overturn




343. Elouise Schumacher, Voice of Hope in Sea of Despair- Former Seattle
Pastor Leads Spiritual, Physical Repair in South Central L.A., SEATTLE TIMES,
May 30, 1992, at All, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
344. Sims, supra note 19, § 3, at 1. William Bitting, executive vice president
and general counsel of S & P Company, stated that "for this great democratic
society to dictate to the black and Hispanic community what type of businesses
they can and cannot have is sheer nonsense and smacks of paternalism." Id.
Robert Sands, vice president of the Canandaigua Wine Company, opines that
"[i]t seems to be rather contradictory of the whole cause of trying to improve
conditions in these areas if we limit a very viable segment of business that is
providing jobs and revenues in an area that so desperately needs them." Id.
345. Mary Kane, Liquor: Inner-city Residents Battle Stores, TIMES-PICA-
YuNE, June 6, 1993, at A22, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
346. Id.
347. Tranquada, supra note 317, at N4. See supra text accompanying notes
232-35.
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municipal liquor license permit. A bill sponsored by the li-
quor lobby is pending before the Legislature which will pre-
empt cities' rights "to locally regulate the land use of liquor
outlets and take away cities' right to enact conditional use
permits."348 The League of California Cities is "vehemently
opposed" to this bill and wishes to preserve the cities' right to
"regulate problem retail liquor establishments to lessen the
adverse public health and safety impacts to the commu-
nity."349 A statewide coalition consisting of small liquor store
owners and industry leaders, such as the California Grocers
Association has criticized local regulations as "anti-minority
and anti-business."35 0 "A lobbyist for the California Beverage
Retailers Association recently told the Assembly's Govern-
ment Organization Committee that the organization wants
only the state to regulate the liquor industry."3 1 Community
activism will be required to counter these efforts by the liquor
industry to restrict local control.3 52
D. Community Redevelopment
In addition to using community activism to resolve
problems caused by local liquor outlets, community redevel-
opment efforts can play an important role in cleaning up
blighted neighborhoods. 53 For example, in September 1992,
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) appropriated $4 million to Los Angeles County, the
City of Los Angeles and six other local communities to assist
them in economic redevelopment following the riots.3 5 4 The
money was to be used for planning, and the City of Los Ange-
348. Cities vs. Liquor Lobby on Local Land Use Control, BUSINESS WIRE,
Mar. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File.
349. Id.
350. Ian Jones, Local Activists Seek to Maintain Control of Liquor Ordi-
nances, FOOD & DRINK DAILY, Oct. 28, 1993, available in WESTLAW, PTS-
NEWS Database.
351. Opinion, supra note 3, at G2.
352. Community activists have won a recent legislative victory with the sign-
ing of four key bills designed to give cities and counties more authority in deal-
ing with alcohol-related problems. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying
text.
353. Indianapolis residents contend, however, that "it's nearly impossible to
rebuild a community choked with liquor stores." Kane, supra note 345, at A22.
354. Marc Lacey, HUD Gives $4 Million in Riot Aid, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1992, at B4 ($1 million was awarded to both Los Angeles County and the City of
Los Angeles, with the remaining $2 million divided among the cities of Long
Beach, Compton, Huntington Park, Inglewood, Lynwood and Pasadena).
[Vol. 35184
DOWN WITH DEMON DRINK
les planned to use its share to decide how to help damaged
businesses, and to attract or expand businesses that provide
goods and services needed by the communities. 55 Part of
this planning effort was to identify business opportunities,
other than liquor stores, which would be beneficial to the
community. 5 6 Liquor stores that were destroyed in the 1992
riots have been offered financial incentives to re-open as
other types of businesses such as laundromats and franchise
fast-food restaurants.3 57 Such enterprises enhance local own-
ership and provide new and needed services to neglected
communities.
Unfortunately, the rebuilding effort has not progressed
as quickly as most had hoped. Two years after the riots,
nearly half of the properties damaged or destroyed remain
empty.358 "Landowners and economic analysts say rebuild-
ing efforts have been hampered by financing and insurance
woes, fear of crime and renewed civil strife, speculation by
absentee landlords, the depressed economy and community
groups' opposition to the return of liquor stores."35 9 Liquor
store owners attempting to rebuild in Los Angeles have had a
difficult time. At public hearings for permits, community
groups oppose the rebuilding requests by citing problems of
drinking and loitering outside the stores. Some owners, in
order to obtain approval, have agreed to conditions such as
hiring security officers, restricting the hours of operation, and
offering to sell fresh meat and produce to a community des-
perately in need of grocery stores.3 ° In addition to doubts
over the success of the rebuilding efforts, concern was ex-
pressed after the January 17, 1994, earthquake about the fu-
ture of the "Rebuild L.A." organization ("RLA") because of the
potential threat that government funds marked for revitali-




357. See Opinion, Neighborhood Cancers: Some Liquor Stores Foster Drugs,
Drunkenness, SAN DIEGO UNION-TalE., July 19, 1993, at B6; Kane, supra note 4,
at C7.
358. Paul Feldman, Vacant Lots: A Stark Tribute to 2nd Anniversary of Ri-
ots, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al.
359. Id. at A22 (emphasis added).
360. Id.
361. Paul Feldman & Ted Rohrlich, Quake May Erode Efforts To Rebuild
Riot-Torn Areas, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1994, at A30.
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Although more than $750 million in state and federal
funds have been devoted to post-riot revitalization, 6 2 not all
community redevelopment in Los Angeles has been spon-
sored by the government. Private institutions have also
pledged to support the rebuilding effort. Bank of America,
California's largest bank, set up a twenty-five million dollar
emergency loan fund to provide support for small businesses
damaged in the riots.3 63 However, certain businesses, such
as liquor stores, that the community considers "undesirable"
have not been given access to these emergency loans.
364 Pri-
vate groups have arranged for access to financing to support
business expansion and the capital improvements needed to
convert liquor store buildings into buildings to be used for
other businesses, such as drive-through restaurants or laun-
dromats. For those liquor store owners who agree to convert
their business, the liquor license itself remains an asset,
which they may choose to sell.365 Franchisers of more desira-
ble businesses have discounted or waived franchise fees to en-
courage liquor store conversion. Two years after the riots, of-
ficials for RLA reported that corporations had come through
with more than half of the $500 million they had pledged for
revitalization of the area. 66 It is evident that private enter-
prise must be involved in any community redevelopment ef-
fort, along with government assistance, in order to realize the
goal of improving the economic conditions and social fabric of
our inner cities.
IV. CONCLUSION
"[No national or even regional consensus has emerged
with respect to the morality and consequence of alcoholic bev-
erages. It has seemed best, in default of consensus, to leave
the matter to local preference as expressed in the voting
booth."3 67
362. Post-Riot Aid Figures Exaggerated; Intentions Good, But Successes Few,
HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 30, 1994, at A16, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
News File.
363. Sims, supra note 19, § 3, at 1.
364. Id.
365. See supra note 325.
366. Calvin Sims, Ueberroth, Amid Criticism, Quits Post at 'Rebuild L.A.'
Consortium, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, § 1, at 6.
367. Philly's v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing Illinois'
local-option liquor law).
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The dilemma of how to deal with the overconcentration of
liquor outlets in urban areas can be resolved, but only with a
concerted effort on several fronts. Primarily, public regula-
tion must be used to effectively address the problem on a uni-
versal scale, rather than by launching individual attacks on
specific outlets. Public regulation permits planning and
proactive control of these outlets as opposed to relying on en-
forcement authorities and litigation to resolve problems with
individual outlets after the detrimental activity occurs. How-
ever, exclusive control at the state level is not the answer.
Regulation of retail liquor sales must be accomplished at the
local level if it is to be successful in resolving the destructive
impact that excessive sales have on urban communities.
To facilitate public regulation at the local level, the state
must first delegate power to local authorities. Two different
types of power exist at the state level. First, the state has
power under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate liquor
sales. Second, the state has general police power to regulate
for the benefit of the public health, safety, morals and wel-
fare. A delegation of the state's Twenty-First Amendment
authority is the most effective way to achieve local control
over liquor sales. The local option election, found in most
states, is just such a delegation. However, the effectiveness
of this local power to prohibit liquor sales in particular locali-
ties will depend upon how political subdivisions are defined.
The subdivision at which the local election occurs must be
small enough to provide meaningful local control.3 68 Another
weakness with the local option approach is that it presents
an "all or nothing" solution for communities. Residents are
not given the power to regulate liquor sales in the commu-
nity, they are only given the option of either allowing or
prohibiting liquor sales.
In addition to local option elections, the referendum pro-
cess can be used to give voters control over the proliferation of
liquor outlets in their neighborhoods. The referendum pro-
cess allows voters to exercise "their traditional right through
direct legislation to override the views of their elected repre-
368. See generally Ole v. Kozubowski, 543 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(discussing validity of precinct boundaries for purposes of a local option
referendum).
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sentatives as to what serves the public interest."369 In Wash-
ington, D.C., residents, who are registered voters within 600
feet of a proposed liquor license applicant, may object to the
issuance of a liquor license.170 This allows local residents di-
rect control over liquor sales in their neighborhood.371
The most effective method of allowing local control is to
comprehensively delegate all state power under the Twenty-
First Amendment to local government.372 However, if a state
desires to completely relinquish its control under the Twenty-
First Amendment, it may be necessary to totally revamp the
state liquor control system.373 State statutory guidelines can
be enacted to supervise the exercise of local power, but no is-
sues of state preemption should arise if the local authorities
act within the state statutory guidelines.
When Twenty-First Amendment power is delegated, the
state must expressly declare that it is the state's Twenty-
First Amendment power which is being delegated, not just
the general police power authority. If local government must
rely on the general police power for its authority, there will
always be potential preemption issues. These preemption is-
sues may compel litigation due to conflict with a state's re-
tained power to regulate liquor under the Twenty-First
Amendment. By delegating the state's Twenty-First Amend-
ment power, preemption issues will be avoided and local gov-
ernment regulations may be given more deference by
courts.
3 7 4
If the state decides to allow local residents to exert con-
trol based only upon a partial delegation of Twenty-First
Amendment authority or upon a delegation of the general po-
lice power, certain land use strategies may, nonetheless, be
369. Sea Girt Restaurant & Tavern Owners Assoc. v. Sea Girt, 625 F. Supp.
at 1482, 1488 (D.N.J. 1986).
370. Benel, Inc. v. Barry, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9692 (D.D.C. 1989).
371. This type of objection is allowed in other states as well. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 30-39 (1992) (ten local residents may file a remonstrance "contain-
ing any objections to the suitability of [an] applicant or proposed place of
business").
372. See supra notes 139-49 and accompanying text.
373. In California, a constitutional amendment will be required. See also,
Kane, supra note 345, at A22 (Mayor of Indianapolis explains that the city of-
fers neighborhoods legal help in their battles with liquor stores because the
"state system for liquor control is too entrenched to reform").
374. In expressly granting power to the states, the Twenty- First Amend-
ment "confer[s] something more than the normal state authority over public
health, welfare and morals." California v. La Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
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effective. Regulating distances between outlets, restricting
hours of operation, requiring approval of local government,
allowing both state and local authorities to license, or requir-
ing a conditional use permit for liquor outlet locations are
methods used to give local residents input and control. Such
regulations may impede access to liquor, by making it less
convenient to obtain, and thus may impact the amount of li-
quor consumed in the community. These restrictions will
also have a positive impact on the particular land use
problems that are associated with a liquor store such as lit-
ter, loitering, prostitution, graffiti, harassment of children on
their way to school, urinating in public, noise, and vandalism.
However, if liquor control authority is shared between the
state and local unit, litigation will likely occur whenever
there is any appearance of conflict between the jurisdictions.
The liquor industry objects to allowing the state to turn
control over to local government. Liquor control is already a
"patch-work" of laws because control is at the state level,
rather than at the federal level. If states turn their control
over to local units, the liquor industry will find little uniform-
ity in the legal structure in which they must operate.375 This
lack of uniformity may or may not affect the product itself,
but it will affect the marketing of the product as well as the
level at which lobbying must occur to preserve the product's
place in our social structure. Individual entrepreneurs and
business enterprises argue that there is a demand for liquor
stores in urban areas, as evidenced by the profit margin of
these outlets in comparison to other businesses. Store own-
ers also argue that they employ local residents and are bring-
ing business establishments to areas where other businesses
refuse to locate. The notion of local control is not necessarily
adverse to these arguments. Local residents are in the best
position to determine whether these outlets are beneficial to
their neighborhood despite the attendant land use problems.
Another way to control the blight in neighborhoods satu-
rated with liquor stores is to increase the level of enforcement
against those criminal activities and nuisances associated
375. Revenue from liquor licensing and permitting may also become an issue
if control is turned over to local government. It stands to reason that the gov-
ernmental unit responsible for administering and enforcing a licensing scheme
should be provided with the resources necessary to maintain these activities.
There are many potential solutions, but the issue must be addressed.
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with some of these outlets. The excessive concentration in in-
ner cities, 519 liquor outlets in a 606-square-block area on
Chicago's south side, for example, makes it difficult for law
enforcement to supply sufficient resources to meet commu-
nity demands.376 It has been suggested that the use of avail-
able resources must be reconsidered and adjusted to provide
more effective protection. 77 When enforcement resources are
thin, problems such as litter, loitering, prostitution, and ver-
bal harassment of residents may not be considered a law en-
forcement priority when police are faced with other neighbor-
hood problems such as drugs, robberies, assaults, and gang-
related shootings.
Private control of liquor sales is not a singular solution.
It can be effective, however, when used in conjunction with
public regulation. Using defeasible fees to transfer property
with a prohibition against liquor sales is not a recommended
approach since the "law abhors forfeiture."3 78 Such condi-
tions are not likely to be enforced because of the resulting for-
feiture, a preemption by public regulation, or the doctrines of
changed conditions or abandonment.3 79 However, the use of
restrictive covenants, either in the conveyance of a fee or of a
leasehold, may be somewhat more effective in restricting li-
quor sales on certain property. Private individuals have to be
willing to include this type of restriction in their bargaining
process and property sellers may be forced to reduce their
sales price if they insist on restricting the use of the property
in the hands of future owners.
Community activism can be a powerful device to combat
the problems that arise with liquor store operations. Resi-
dents can influence public regulation by voting, attending
public hearings to protest liquor licensing actions, and mak-
ing their views known to state and local politicians. In addi-
tion, community activism may be used to supplement public
regulation and enforcement by pressuring local stores,
through discussion or boycotts, to retain better control over
their premises. This type of encouragement is valuable when
376. See Sims, supra note 19, § 3, at 1.
377. See Robert Rector, A Comprehensive Urban Policy: How to Fix Welfare
and Revitalize America's Inner Cities, HERITAGE FoUND. REP., Jan. 18, 1993, at
1; Testimony of David Boyam & Mark Kleiman, Profs., Harvard Univ. House
Gov't Affairs, May 25, 1994.
378. Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 381 P.2d 13, 16 (Colo. 1963).
379. See supra notes 295-315 and accompanying text.
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enforcement authorities are not available to police individual
outlets or when problems arise that are specific to a particu-
lar location. The use of nuisance law may also supplement
public regulation by providing a mechanism to control indi-
vidual locations that are encouraging undesirable activity.
38 0
In order to adequately address the social problems asso-
ciated with the overconcentration of liquor outlets in urban
areas, a state must first review its public regulation scheme
to ensure that it has delegated the maximum amount of con-
trol possible to local government. Community activism and
nuisance law can then be used to police individual outlets
which are creating community problems, either by violating
local ordinances or by encouraging nuisance-type activity on
or near the premises. Finally, community redevelopment
must be used to revitalize neighborhoods damaged or de-
stroyed by criminal activity and social blight. This redevelop-
ment will require both government funds and private enter-
prise contributions to encourage change in the character of
the businesses allowed to operate within a community.
Incentives should be used to convince current liquor
store owners to convert their businesses to ones which will
benefit the community. It may be necessary to compensate
liquor store owners for lost profits, relocation, or the loss of a
liquor license. Perhaps, with the right amount of planning
and funding, a community may be allowed to "buy-back" its
neighborhood by purchasing liquor outlet locations and retir-
ing liquor licenses.
There are many avenues that may be used to resolve the
overconcentration problem. Public regulation, increased en-
forcement of existing controls, and private control of land use
through nuisance law, restrictive covenants, and community
activism will provide the tools to improve the quality of life in
urban areas. Communities must be given effective local con-
trol over liquor outlets in order to successfully revitalize their
neighborhoods and ensure that at least one of several urban
life problems has been solved.
380. Actions by store owners that encourage unwanted activity include plac-
ing couches in the parking lot, selling individual cups, providing pay telephones
often used for drug sales, selling cheap, potent beverages, such as malt liquor,
and tolerating deviant behavior among patrons. See Sims, supra note 19, § 3, at
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